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<b>State Bar Court of California</b> <b>Hearing Department</b> <b>Los Angeles</b> <b>DISBARMENT</b>		
Counsel For The State Bar  <b>Anand Kumar</b> <b>Senior Trial Counsel</b> <b>845 South Figueroa Street</b> <b>Los Angeles, CA 90017</b> <b>(213) 765-1714</b>  Bar # 261592	Case Number(s): <b>15-O-15840-YDR</b>	For Court use only  <div style="text-align: center;"> <b>FILED</b>   <b>JUL 20 2017</b>    <b>STATE BAR COURT</b>  <b>CLERK'S OFFICE</b>  <b>LOS ANGELES</b> </div>
In Pro Per Respondent  <b>Kenneth Leon Schreiber</b> <b>Law Office of Kenneth L. Schreiber APC</b> <b>P.O. Box 14846</b> <b>Irvine, CA 92623</b> <b>(949) 852-0411</b>  Bar # 42372	<b>PUBLIC MATTER</b>	
In the Matter of: <b>KENNETH LEON SCHREIBER</b>  Bar # 42372  A Member of the State Bar of California (Respondent)	Submitted to: <b>Settlement Judge</b>  STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING; ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE ENROLLMENT  <b>DISBARMENT</b>  <input type="checkbox"/> PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED	

**Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.**

#### A. Parties' Acknowledgments:

- (1) Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted **June 19, 1968**.
- (2) The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
- (3) All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of **(13)** pages, not including the order.
- (4) A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."

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- (5) Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law."
- (6) The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
- (7) No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
- (8) Payment of Disciplinary Costs—Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
- Costs to be awarded to the State Bar.
  - Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
  - Costs are entirely waived.
- (9) ORDER OF INACTIVE ENROLLMENT:  
The parties are aware that if this stipulation is approved, the judge will issue an order of inactive enrollment under Business and Professions Code section 6007, subdivision (c)(4), and Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, rule 5.111(D)(1).

**B. Aggravating Circumstances [Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct, standards 1.2(h) & 1.5]. Facts supporting aggravating circumstances are required.**

- (1)  **Prior record of discipline**
- (a)  State Bar Court case # of prior case **00-O-11893**
  - (b)  Date prior discipline effective **January 25, 2002**
  - (c)  Rules of Professional Conduct/ State Bar Act violations: **rule 4-100(B)(4) [failing to promptly pay out client funds]**
  - (d)  Degree of prior discipline **private reproof.**
- For further discussion of Respondent's prior record of discipline, see page 9.**
- (e)  If respondent has two or more incidents of prior discipline, use space provided below:
- (2)  **Intentional/Bad Faith/Dishonesty:** Respondent's misconduct was dishonest, intentional, or surrounded by, or followed by bad faith.
- (3)  **Misrepresentation:** Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by, or followed by misrepresentation.
- (4)  **Concealment:** Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by, or followed by concealment.
- (5)  **Overreaching:** Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by, or followed by overreaching.
- (6)  **Uncharged Violations:** Respondent's conduct involves uncharged violations of the Business and Professions Code or the Rules of Professional Conduct.

- (7)  **Trust Violation:** Trust funds or property were involved and Respondent refused or was unable to account to the client or person who was the object of the misconduct for improper conduct toward said funds or property.
- (8)  **Harm:** Respondent's misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public, or the administration of justice. **See pages 9-10.**
- (9)  **Indifference:** Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for the consequences of his or her misconduct.
- (10)  **Lack of Candor/Cooperation:** Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims of his/her misconduct, or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigations or proceedings.
- (11)  **Multiple Acts:** Respondent's current misconduct evidences multiple acts of wrongdoing. See page 9.
- (12)  **Pattern:** Respondent's current misconduct demonstrates a pattern of misconduct.
- (13)  **Restitution:** Respondent failed to make restitution.
- (14)  **Vulnerable Victim:** The victim(s) of Respondent's misconduct was/were highly vulnerable.
- (15)  **No aggravating circumstances** are involved.

**Additional aggravating circumstances:**

**C. Mitigating Circumstances [see standards 1.2(i) & 1.6]. Facts supporting mitigating circumstances are required.**

- (1)  **No Prior Discipline:** Respondent has no prior record of discipline over many years of practice coupled with present misconduct which is not likely to recur.
- (2)  **No Harm:** Respondent did not harm the client, the public, or the administration of justice.
- (3)  **Candor/Cooperation:** Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and cooperation with the victims of his/her misconduct or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigations and proceedings.
- (4)  **Remorse:** Respondent promptly took objective steps demonstrating spontaneous remorse and recognition of the wrongdoing, which steps were designed to timely atone for any consequences of his/her misconduct.
- (5)  **Restitution:** Respondent paid \$ \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_ in restitution to \_\_\_\_\_ without the threat or force of disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings.
- (6)  **Delay:** These disciplinary proceedings were excessively delayed. The delay is not attributable to respondent and the delay prejudiced him/her.
- (7)  **Good Faith:** Respondent acted with a good faith belief that was honestly held and objectively reasonable.
- (8)  **Emotional/Physical Difficulties:** At the time of the stipulated act or acts of professional misconduct respondent suffered extreme emotional difficulties or physical or mental disabilities which expert testimony would establish was directly responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities were not the

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product of any illegal conduct by the member, such as illegal drug or substance abuse, and the difficulties or disabilities no longer pose a risk that Respondent will commit misconduct.

- (9)  **Severe Financial Stress:** At the time of the misconduct, respondent suffered from severe financial stress which resulted from circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond his/her control and which were directly responsible for the misconduct.
- (10)  **Family Problems:** At the time of the misconduct, respondent suffered extreme difficulties in his/her personal life which were other than emotional or physical in nature.
- (11)  **Good Character:** Respondent's extraordinarily good character is attested to by a wide range of references in the legal and general communities who are aware of the full extent of his/her misconduct.
- (12)  **Rehabilitation:** Considerable time has passed since the acts of professional misconduct occurred followed by subsequent rehabilitation.
- (13)  **No mitigating circumstances** are involved.

**Additional mitigating circumstances: Pretrial Stipulation (see page 10)**

**D. Discipline: Disbarment.**

**E. Additional Requirements:**

- (1) **Rule 9.20, California Rules of Court:** Respondent must comply with the requirements of rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 calendar days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court's Order in this matter.
  
- (2)  **Restitution:** Respondent must make restitution to \_\_\_\_\_ in the amount of \$ \_\_\_\_\_ plus 10 percent interest per year from \_\_\_\_\_. If the Client Security Fund has reimbursed \_\_\_\_\_ for all or any portion of the principal amount, respondent must pay restitution to CSF of the amount paid plus applicable interest and costs in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6140.5. Respondent must pay the above restitution and furnish satisfactory proof of payment to the State Bar's Office of Probation in Los Angeles no later than \_\_\_\_\_ days from the effective date of the Supreme Court order in this case.
  
- (3)  **Other:**



7. On August 3, 2011, without Snyder's knowledge or consent, including without any additional authorization or direction from Snyder to disburse or apply the remaining \$22,500 balance to his fees or costs, respondent unilaterally applied funds to his legal fees causing the balance in respondent's CTA to decrease to \$20,711.68. Accordingly, on August 3, 2011, respondent failed to maintain at least \$22,500 on Snyder's behalf in his CTA.

8. On September 28, 2011, respondent received an additional \$10,000 in advanced costs from Snyder's mother for Snyder's benefit, which respondent deposited in his CTA on October 5, 2011. Accordingly, after October 5, 2011, respondent was required to maintain at least \$32,500 in his CTA (\$22,500 + \$10,000).

9. On November 16, 2011, Respondent reimbursed himself \$423.90 for costs associated with Snyder's case by issuing himself a check in that amount from his CTA. After the \$423.90 disbursement, on November 16, 2011, respondent was required to maintain a balance of \$32,076.10 in his CTA (\$32,500 - \$423.90). On January 11, 2012, the balance in respondent's CTA fell to \$11,039.06, and accordingly Respondent failed to maintain at least \$32,076.10 on Snyder's behalf.

10. Between January 12, 2012 and February 1, 2012, respondent issued two CTA checks totaling \$2,500 to pay costs on Snyder's behalf. After the \$2,500 cost disbursements, on February 1, 2012, respondent was required to maintain a balance of \$29,576.10 on Snyder's behalf in his CTA (\$32,076.10 - \$2,500).

11. Between February 1, 2012 and June 19, 2012, respondent continued to unilaterally apply Snyder's funds to his legal fees causing the balance in respondent's CTA to decrease to \$3,742.55 and as a result, on June 19, 2012, respondent failed to maintain a balance of \$29,576.10 on Snyder's behalf in his CTA.

12. Between June 25, 2012 and July 10, 2012, respondent charged Snyder an additional \$55,000, including \$35,000 of which was earmarked for advance legal fees and \$20,000 costs for respondent to represent Snyder through the duration of his criminal trial, all of which respondent collected from Snyder's mother. Between June 28, 2012 and July 10, 2012, respondent deposited the additional \$20,000 advanced costs in his CTA, requiring respondent to maintain a balance of \$49,576.10 on Snyder's behalf in his CTA (\$29,576.10 + \$20,000).

13. Between July 10, 2012 and October 23, 2012, respondent issued and paid seven CTA checks for costs on Snyder's behalf totaling \$9,060.32. As a result, after October 23, 2012, respondent was required to maintain a balance of \$40,515.78 on Snyder's behalf in his CTA (\$49,576.10 - \$9,060.32).

14. Between October 24, 2012 and November 8, 2012, respondent continued to unilaterally apply Snyder's funds to his legal fees causing the balance in respondent's CTA to decrease to \$1,762.23 and as a result, on November 8, 2012, respondent failed to maintain a balance of \$40,515.78 on Snyder's behalf in his CTA.

15. As of April 11, 2013, respondent had only earned \$9,992.50 of the additional \$35,000 advanced fees collected from Snyder's parents in June 2012 to represent Snyder through trial. Accordingly, as of April 11, 2013, respondent had failed to earn \$25,007.50 of the \$35,000 in advanced legal fees earmarked for Snyder's trial (\$35,000 - \$9,992.50).

16. Between April 11, 2013 and May 14, 2013, respondent did not perform any additional legal services on Snyder's behalf, and therefore on May 14, 2013, respondent had still failed to earn the remaining \$25,007.50 advanced trial fees.

17. On May 14, 2013, approximately seventeen months prior to the commencement of Snyder's criminal trial, which did not commence in Snyder's case until October 27, 2014, Snyder terminated respondent's services, and another attorney substituted into the case on Snyder's behalf and represented Snyder through the duration of the proceedings, including trial.

18. As a result of respondent's termination on May 14, 2013, respondent did not earn all of the advanced fees to represent Snyder at trial, and owed Snyder a refund of \$25,007.50 in unearned legal fees earmarked for Snyder's trial representation.

19. On May 14, 2013, Snyder was also entitled to a refund from respondent in the amount of \$40,515.78, for the balance of the entrusted funds and additional unused costs earmarked to represent Snyder at trial.

20. Upon termination, respondent failed to promptly refund the unearned fees (\$25,007.50) and additional \$40,515.78 entrusted funds entitled to Snyder and earmarked for Snyder's benefit, and failed to promptly render an accounting to Snyder of the remaining unearned fees and remaining entrusted funds that should have been refunded to Snyder.

21. Between May 14, 2013 and August 16, 2013, respondent unilaterally applied Snyder's funds to his legal fees causing the balance in respondent's CTA to decrease to \$521.97.

22. As a result of his repeatedly and unilaterally applying Snyder's funds to his legal fees without Snyder's knowledge or consent between August 3, 2011 and August 16, 2013, respondent dishonestly misappropriated, for respondent's own purposes, the cumulative sum of \$39,993.81 entitled to Snyder (\$40,515.78 - \$521.97). While respondent believed he was entitled to said funds for his legal fees, his belief was not objectively reasonable and he could not have held an honest belief as to an entitlement to those funds, in part, because Snyder never consented or authorized respondent to disburse to himself the entrusted funds and respondent never represented Snyder through trial, and therefore his appropriation of those entrusted funds was dishonest.

23. On February 24, 2014, Snyder sent a letter to respondent, which respondent received, requesting a refund of the unearned fees and unused costs. Respondent failed to pay promptly, as requested by respondent's client, any portion of the funds in respondent's possession until December 16, 2015 as stated below.

24. While Snyder's criminal case was still pending, in April 2014, Snyder and his mother disputed respondent's legal fees and costs and pursued fee arbitration against respondent through the Orange County Bar Association ("OCBA").

25. After a hearing, on July 20, 2015, the OCBA filed a Mandatory Fee Arbitration Award and Findings of Fact in favor of Snyder and his mother, finding that respondent mishandled Snyder's funds and owed restitution to Snyder. After Snyder and his mother filed a motion to confirm the arbitration award, resulting in a judgment against respondent, between December 16, 2015 and January 14, 2016, respondent disbursed two cashier's checks totaling \$90,000 to Snyder in satisfaction of the judgment.



## CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

26. By collecting legal fees totaling \$102,500 from Snyder's mother without obtaining his client Snyder's informed written consent to receive such compensation, respondent willfully violated the Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-310(F).

27. By failing to maintain entrusted funds totaling \$40,515.78 entitled to Snyder on Snyder's behalf in his CTA through August 16, 2013, respondent failed to maintain funds for the benefit of a client and deposited in a bank account labeled "Trust Account," "Client's Funds Account" or words of similar import, in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(A).

28. By dishonestly misappropriating, for respondent's own purposes, the cumulative sum of \$39,993.81 entitled to Snyder through August 16, 2013, respondent committed an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption in willful violation of Business and Professions Code section 6106.

29. By failing upon his May 14, 2013 termination to refund any portion of the \$25,007.50 unearned legal fees earmarked for trial to Snyder until December 16, 2015, respondent failed to promptly refund a part of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned, in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(2).

30. By failing upon termination to provide an accounting to Snyder of the unearned legal fees earmarked for Snyder's trial (\$25,007.50) and balance of entrusted funds entitled to Snyder (\$40,515.78), respondent failed to render an appropriate accounting to a client, in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(B)(3).

31. By failing to refund to Snyder of any portion of the balance of entrusted funds entitled to Snyder (\$40,515.78) after receiving Snyder's February 24, 2014 letter until December 16, 2015, respondent failed to pay promptly, as requested by respondent's client, any portion of the client's funds in respondent's possession which the client is entitled to receive, in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(B)(4).

## AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

**Prior Record of Discipline (Std. 1.5(a)):** Respondent has one prior record of discipline—a private reproof—from 2002 after being admitted to practice law in 1968. Specifically, Respondent entered into a disciplinary stipulation in State Bar case number 00-O-11893 on December 27, 2001, wherein Respondent received a private reproof with a one (1) year reproof period with conditions. The ensuing disciplinary order became effective on January 9, 2002. In that matter, Respondent stipulated that he violated rule 4-100(B)(4) for failing to promptly disburse \$281.32 in settlement funds for three years to a client.

**Multiple Acts of Wrongdoing (Std. 1.5(b)):** Respondent committed multiple acts of misconduct by engaging in a series of acts reflecting his mishandling of Snyder's funds and other fees-related ethical violations. The commission of multiple acts of misconduct is considered serious aggravation here.

**Significant Harm to Client (Std. 1.5(j)):** Respondent's misconduct in failing to properly maintain Snyder's client funds, and misappropriating a total of \$39,993.81 of Snyder's funds, failing to promptly refund the unearned trial fees and promptly return the remaining balance of entrusted funds,

caused significant harm to his client by causing Snyder to expend additional financial resources to hire a new attorney to represent him at trial in 2014 until he obtained a judgment against respondent and recovered restitution from respondent in December 2015.

#### **MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.**

**Pretrial Stipulation:** By entering into this stipulation, respondent has acknowledged misconduct and is entitled to mitigation for recognition of wrongdoing and saving the State Bar significant resources and time. (*Silva-Vidor v. State Bar* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1071, 1079 [where mitigative credit was given for entering into a stipulation as to facts and culpability]; *In the Matter of Spaith* (Review Dept. 1996) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 511, 521 [where the attorney's stipulation to facts and culpability was held to be a mitigating circumstance].)

#### **AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.**

The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct “set forth a means for determining the appropriate disciplinary sanction in a particular case and to ensure consistency across cases dealing with similar misconduct and surrounding circumstances.” (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, std. 1.1. All further references to standards are to this source.) The standards help fulfill the primary purposes of discipline, which include: protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; maintenance of the highest professional standards; and preservation of public confidence in the legal profession. (See std. 1.1; *In re Morse* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 184, 205.)

Although not binding, the standards are entitled to “great weight” and should be followed “whenever possible” in determining level of discipline. (*In re Silvertown* (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 92, quoting *In re Brown* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 205, 220 and *In re Young* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 267, fn. 11.) Adherence to the standards in the great majority of cases serves the valuable purpose of eliminating disparity and assuring consistency, that is, the imposition of similar attorney discipline for instances of similar attorney misconduct. (*In re Naney* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 190.) If a recommendation is at the high end or low end of a standard, an explanation must be given as to how the recommendation was reached. (Std. 1.1.) “Any disciplinary recommendation that deviates from the Standards must include clear reasons for the departure.” (Std. 1.1; *Blair v. State Bar* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 762, 776, fn. 5.)

In determining whether to impose a sanction greater or less than that specified in a given standard, in addition to the factors set forth in the specific standard, consideration is to be given to the primary purposes of discipline; the balancing of all aggravating and mitigating circumstances; the type of misconduct at issue; whether the client, public, legal system or profession was harmed; and the member's willingness and ability to conform to ethical responsibilities in the future. (Stds. 1.7(b) and (c).)

In this matter, respondent admits to committing six acts of professional misconduct. Standard 1.7(a) requires that where a respondent “commits two or more acts of misconduct and the Standards specify different sanctions for each act, the most severe sanction must be imposed.” The most severe sanction applicable to respondent's misconduct here is Standard 2.1(a), which applies to respondent's dishonest misappropriation of Snyder's funds.

Standard 2.1(a) provides disbarment is the presumed sanction for a dishonest misappropriation of entrusted funds, unless the amount misappropriated is insignificantly small or sufficiently compelling mitigating circumstances clearly predominate.

An attorney's appropriation of clients funds based on an unreasonable but honest belief of entitlement to the funds constitutes only a violation of the rule of professional conduct regarding client trust funds, and not an act of moral turpitude or dishonesty; however, where an attorney could not have held an honest belief that he was entitled to some of the money he withdrew from a client trust account, his misappropriation of those funds not only violated the rule governing client trust funds, but also involved moral turpitude. (See *In the Matter of Nelson* (Review Dept. 1990) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 153, 168-169.) Here, respondent unilaterally applied entrusted funds towards his own legal fees and failed to promptly relinquish the unearned trial fees, which was neither reasonable nor could he have held an honest belief to the entitlement to those funds given that he never represented Snyder through the duration of his trial and that much of the funds were entrusted funds requiring Snyder's consent and authorization prior to disbursement. Since respondent used the funds for a purpose other than which Snyder had earmarked and authorized respondent to use the entrusted the funds for, his misconduct constitutes misappropriation. (See e.g., *In the Matter of Blum* (Review Dept. 2002) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 403, 410 ["[A]n attorney's failure to use entrusted funds for the purpose for which they were entrusted constitutes misappropriation."] ) Moreover, the amount of funds he misappropriated is significant (approximately \$40,000) and even though Respondent may have subsequently refunded all of the funds that he had previously misappropriated from his own funds, repayment of the funds is no defense to culpability for the underlying misappropriation. (*In the Matter of Elliott* (Review Dept. 1996) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 541, 544.) Accordingly, respondent's misappropriation reflects moral turpitude.

Besides respondent's pretrial stipulation, there are no other mitigating circumstances surrounding his misconduct. By contrast, respondent's misconduct is surrounded by serious aggravating circumstances, including significant harm, multiple acts of misconduct and a prior record of discipline, which also involved CTA misconduct. Although this is one instance of misappropriation in respondent's 39-year legal career, his misconduct is extremely serious and surrounded by significant aggravating circumstances, and therefore, disbarment is the only appropriate discipline for the protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; maintenance of the highest professional standards; and preservation of public confidence in the legal profession.

Relevant case law also supports disbarment here. The Supreme Court has consistently stated that misappropriation generally warrants disbarment in the absence of clearly mitigating circumstances. (*Kelly v. State Bar* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 649, 656; *Cain v. State Bar* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 956, 961.) The Supreme Court has also imposed disbarment on attorneys with no prior record of discipline in cases involving a single misappropriation. (See e.g., *In re Abbott* (1977) 19 Cal.3d 249 [misappropriation of \$29,500.00]; *Kaplan v. State Bar* (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1067 [attorney with over 11 years of discipline-free practice and no prior record misappropriated approximately \$29,500.00 in law firm funds over an 8-month period]; *Chang v. State Bar* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 114 [misappropriated \$7,900.00]; *In the Matter of Blum, supra*, 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 403 [misappropriated \$55,000.00 from a single client]; *In re Spaith* (Review Dept. 1996) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 511 [misappropriation of nearly \$40,000.00 and mislead client for a year]; *Kennedy v. State Bar* (1989) 48 Cal.3d 610 [misappropriated over \$10,000.00 from multiple clients]; see also std. 1.8(c) ["Sanctions may be imposed, including disbarment, even if a member has no prior record of discipline."] ) Therefore, Respondent's misconduct warrants disbarment.

**COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.**


Respondent acknowledges that the Office of Chief Trial Counsel has informed respondent that as of June 7, 2017, the discipline costs in this matter are approximately \$3,852. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.


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In the Matter of: KENNETH LEON SCHREIBER	Case number(s): 15-O-15840
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**SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES**

By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitations and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Disposition.

June 16, 2017  Kenneth Leon Schreiber  
Date Respondent's Signature Print Name

Date Respondent's Counsel Signature Print Name  
June 22, 2017  Anand Kumar  
Date Deputy Trial Counsel's Signature Print Name

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In the Matter of: KENNETH LEON SCHREIBER	Case Number(s): 15-O-15840
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### DISBARMENT ORDER

Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any, is GRANTED without prejudice, and:

- The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
- The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
- All Hearing dates are vacated.

The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58(E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) **The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)**

Respondent Kenneth Leon Schreiber is ordered transferred to involuntary inactive status pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6007, subdivision (c)(4). Respondent's inactive enrollment will be effective three (3) calendar days after this order is served by mail and will terminate upon the effective date of the Supreme Court's order imposing discipline herein, or as provided for by rule 5.111(D)(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California, or as otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court pursuant to its plenary jurisdiction.

July 20, 2017  
Date

Rebecca Meyer Rosenberg  
REBECCA MEYER ROSENBERG, JUDGE PRO TEM  
Judge of the State Bar Court

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on July 20, 2017, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING; ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE ENROLLMENT

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:


- by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:

KENNETH LEON SCHREIBER  
LAW OFC KENNETH L SCHREIBER APC  
PO BOX 14846  
IRVINE, CA 92623 - 4846

- by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

Anand Kumar, Enforcement, Los Angeles

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on July 20, 2017.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Angela Carpenter  
Case Administrator  
State Bar Court