PUBLIC MATTER

STATE BAR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

HEARING DEPARTMENT – LOS ANGELES

In the Matter of	)	Case No.: 16-O-13517-CV
	)	
FREDERICK JAMES WOOD,	)	
	)	DECISION
Member No. 121994,	)	
	)	
A Member of the State Bar.	)	

Introduction[1]

In this contested disciplinary matter, respondent Frederick James Wood (Respondent) is charged with five counts of misconduct stemming from a single client matter. The alleged misconduct included improper withdrawal from employment, failure to promptly release a client file, failing to perform legal services with competence, failing to respond to client inquiries, and failing to obey court orders.

Having considered the facts and the law, the court finds Respondent culpable on four of the five counts, and recommends, among other things, that he be suspended for a minimum of 60 days and until full payment of restitution.

Significant Procedural History

The Office of Chief Trial Counsel of the State Bar of California (OCTC) initiated this proceeding by filing a Notice of Disciplinary Charges (NDC) against Respondent on November 28, 2016. Following Respondent's non-appearance at the initial status conference, the court

[1] Unless otherwise indicated, all references to rules refer to the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct and all statutory references are to the Business and Professions Code.

entered his default on January 20, 2017. On April 20, 2017, Respondent filed a motion to set aside his default. That motion was granted on May 24, 2017. Respondent's response to the NDC was filed that same day.

Trial was held on November 1, 2017. The OCTC was represented by Supervising Attorney Drew Massey and Deputy Trial Counsel Angie Esquivel. Respondent represented himself. Following the filing of closing briefs, this matter was submitted for decision on November 15, 2017.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in California on December 12, 1985, and has been a member of the State Bar of California at all times since that date.

Facts

Respondent was hired to represent Alan and Eliza Cheng (the Chengs) with regard to a landlord tenant dispute. The Chengs reside in Virginia but own rental property in Atascadero, California. Mrs. Cheng hired Respondent at the recommendation of a friend. She initially hired Respondent to assist her in responding to a letter dated January 28, 2014, from Michael Boyajian (Boyajian), an attorney hired by one of the Chengs' tenants regarding separate utility meters for the main house and a guest house owned by the Chengs. Because Mrs. Cheng resides in Virginia she never met with Respondent in person. They communicated through phone calls and email, and a retainer agreement was never executed.

Respondent replied to Boyajian's letter on March 14, 2014. Thereafter, at the Chengs' direction, Respondent engaged in efforts with respect to obtaining defense and indemnity with the Chengs' insurance providers.

On April 16, 2014, litigation ensued in the form of a civil complaint captioned *Brenda Sparks v. Alan Cheng and Eliza Cheng* in the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, case No.

14CVP-0105. On July 11, 2014, Mrs. Cheng paid Respondent a legal fee of approximately $3,000.[2] Respondent actively corresponded with Mrs. Cheng, opposing counsel, and insurance carriers. He also contested a default motion and appeared at two case management conferences.

On July 29, 2014, Boyajian served Respondent with requests for admission and a first set of form interrogatories. On August 5, 2014, Respondent provided (via email) the discovery requests to the Chengs and asked them to provide information responsive to the requests. On August 19, 2014, Respondent renewed his request for information with the Chengs and provided answers to several questions posed by Mrs. Cheng. (Exhibit 10.) On August 21, 2014, Respondent corresponded with the Chengs regarding specific questions they had pertaining to the first set of form interrogatories. (Exhibit 14.) That same day, the Chengs provided Respondent their responses to the interrogatories. (Exhibit 14.)

A few days earlier, on August 18, 2014, a second set of discovery requests for admission and form interrogatories, as well as a request for production of documents, were propounded by Boyajian. Respondent did not serve responses to the second set of discovery requests. Nor did he request an extension of time to file responses to the second set of discovery requests.

On August 28, 2014, Boyajian notified Respondent that the responses to the first set of form interrogatories were past due. (Exhibit 15.) On August 29, 2014, Respondent emailed the draft first set of form interrogatories to the Chengs for review. (Exhibit 16.) On or about September 2, 2014, Respondent served Boyajian with the Chengs' responses to the first set of form interrogatories. (Exhibits 1012 & 1013.)

On August 30, 2014, Respondent sent an email to the Chengs answering questions they had about the second set of form interrogatories. On September 2, 2014, the Chengs emailed

[2] There is some dispute regarding exactly how much the Chengs paid Respondent; however, that issue is not pertinent to these proceedings, as Respondent has not been charged with failing to refund an unearned fee.

their responses to the second set of form interrogatories to Respondent. Respondent, however, subsequently failed to respond to any of Boyajian's outstanding discovery requests.

Respondent's last appearance in the Chengs' matter was at a case management conference on October 1, 2014. (Exhibit 25, p. 2.) In or about this same time period, Respondent stopped communicating with the Chengs.

On October 3, 2014, Boyajian filed a motion asking that the requests for admission be deemed admitted and for monetary sanctions. (Exhibit 27.) Respondent did not file a response to this motion.

On October 7, 2014, Boyajian sent a "meet and confer" letter to Respondent regarding the August 18, 2016 interrogatories and request for production of documents. (Exhibit 19.) Respondent never replied to the meet and confer letter. (Exhibit 33, p. 2.)

On October 28, 2014, Boyajian filed motions to: (1) compel responses to the second set of form interrogatories (Exhibit 30); and (2) compel a response to the August 18, 2014 request for production of documents (Exhibit 31). Respondent did not file a response to either of these motions.

Respondent did not appear at the December 2, 2014 hearing that had been noticed by Boyajian. At that hearing, Boyajian's motions were granted, and the Chengs were sanctioned a total of $3,885. (Exhibits 34, 36, and 37.). Copies of the sanction orders against the Chengs were served on Respondent at his then membership records address. The court also ordered Respondent to appear at an order to show cause hearing on February 3, 2015.

On February 3, 2015, Respondent did not appear at the order to show cause hearing. Respondent was sanctioned $250 for failing to appear at the order to show cause hearing. (Exhibit 25, p. 5.)

Respondent did not advise the Chengs that sanctions had been levied against them. Sometime later, Mrs. Cheng called the court herself and learned about the sanctions. On August 22, 2015, the Chengs paid the sanctions against them. (Exhibit 41.) Respondent has not reimbursed the Chengs or paid his own $250 sanction.

Mrs. Cheng requested status reports via email on January 8, January 27, and February 11, 2015. Respondent received Mrs. Cheng's emails but did not reply to any of her requests for a status update.

Mrs. Cheng's January 8, 2015 email stated, in part, "Can you please update me on this case? Do we have the arbitration date yet?" (Exhibit 24, p. 2.) After receiving no reply from Respondent, Mrs. Cheng's January 27, 2015 email stated, "Not sure why you are not responding to my email and phone messages? Do I need to look for a replacement lawyer? Your reply will be greatly appreciated. Thank you."[3] (Exhibit 24, p. 1.)

The Chengs ultimately hired substitute counsel – Trace Milan. On March 24, 2015, Milan personally served Respondent with a letter identifying himself as replacement counsel, requesting that Respondent sign the substitution of attorney form, and requesting the client's file. (Exhibit 39, p. 6.)

Respondent received but did not reply to Milan's letter.[4] This caused Milan to send subsequent demands on April 3 and April 24, 2015. These two letters were also delivered by personal service. Again, Respondent received these letters but did not reply.

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[3] Respondent's claim that he interpreted this email to be a termination letter is not credible. First, the plain language of the email clearly does not terminate Respondent. Second, upon receipt of this email Respondent did not confirm his termination or take any other steps reflecting an understanding that his services had been terminated, such as advising Mrs. Cheng of all pertinent deadlines and sanctions, and returning the client file to Mrs. Cheng.

[4] Respondent's claim that he did not receive many of Milan's letters and related court orders is not credible, as it is directly contradicted by Milan's testimony and the relevant proofs of service.

Ultimately, in May 2015, Milan filed a motion to be substituted in as counsel for Mrs. Cheng. The motion was properly served on Respondent. On May 11, 2015, the court granted the motion and ordered Respondent to "produce" Mrs. Cheng's file.[5] (Exhibit 40.)

On May 28, 2015, Respondent sent a letter to Milan indicating that he was hoping to have the file copied and ready the following week. (Exhibit 1004.) Because Milan did not have an office, Respondent was directed by Milan's assistant "Trish" to leave the file at the front desk of Respondent's office and Milan would pick up the file there.[6] Respondent then had the file copied over the weekend and left it at the front desk of his office for Milan to pick up.[7]

Approximately a month later, Respondent contacted Milan's office and advised that the Chengs' file had yet to be picked up. Respondent created a new cover letter (dated June 25, 2015) with the expectation that the file would soon be picked up. Milan's office still did not pick up the file; however, at some point, Milan personally dropped by, but Respondent's office was closed at the time. Ultimately, on October 14, 2015, Respondent had the file delivered directly to Milan.

Conclusions

Count One – Rule 3-700(A)(2) [Improper Withdrawal from Employment]

Rule 3-700(A)(2) prohibits an attorney from withdrawing from employment until the attorney has taken reasonable steps to avoid reasonably foreseeable prejudice to the client's

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[5] Milan later followed the same procedure to substitute in as attorney for Mr. Cheng.

[6] Respondent's testimony on this subject was (1) corroborated by Milan's testimony at trial where he stated that he thinks that he stopped by Respondent's office to pick up the client's file on his way to court in this case because Respondent's office was conveniently located on the way to the court house; (2) consistent with Milan's practice of personal service of court documents to Respondent's office on at least three separate occasions, and (3) confirmed by exhibits 1004-1011. Trish did not testify in these proceedings.

[7] The court takes judicial notice that May 28, 2015, was a Thursday. Accordingly, the Chengs' file was made available for Milan to pick up as early as Monday, June 1, 2015.

rights, including giving due notice to the client, allowing time for the employment of other counsel, and complying with rule 3-700(D) and other applicable rules and laws. Respondent constructively terminated his employment in or about October 1, 2014, by failing to take any subsequent action on the Chengs' behalf and failing to inform the Chengs that he was withdrawing from employment. By failing to take necessary steps to avoid reasonably foreseeable prejudice to his clients after termination of employment, Respondent willfully violated rule 3-700(A)(2).

Count Two – Rule 3-700(D)(1) [Failure to Return Client Papers/Property]

Rule 3-700(D)(1) requires an attorney, upon termination of employment, to promptly release to the client, at the client's request, all client papers and property, subject to any protective order or non-disclosure agreement. Milan requested the Chengs' file on three separate occasions between March 24 and April 24, 2015. Respondent, however, did not make the Chengs' file available for pick-up until June 1, 2015 – over two months after it was first requested and eight months after Respondent ceased working on the Chengs' matter. By failing to promptly release to the Chengs, after the termination of Respondent's employment, all of their papers and property upon their request, Respondent willfully violated rule 3-700(D)(1).

Count Three – Rule 3-110(A) [Failure to Perform Legal Services with Competence]

Rule 3-110(A) provides that an attorney must not intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly fail to perform legal services with competence. Respondent willfully violated rule 3-110(A) by failing to respond to discovery on his clients' behalf, failing to respond to the subsequent discovery motions filed by opposing counsel, and failing to appear in court.

Count Four – Section 6068, subd. (m) [Failure to Communicate]

Section 6068, subdivision (m), provides that an attorney has a duty to promptly respond to reasonable status inquiries of clients and to keep clients reasonably informed of significant

developments in matters with regard to which the attorney has agreed to provide legal services. By failing to respond to Mrs. Cheng's emails between January 8 and February 11, 2015, seeking a reasonable status update, Respondent willfully violated section 6068, subdivision (m).[8]

Count Five – Section 6103 [Failure to Obey a Court Order]

Section 6103 provides, in pertinent part, that a willful disobedience or violation of a court order requiring an attorney to do or forbear an act connected with or in the course of the attorney's profession, which an attorney ought in good faith to do or forbear, constitutes cause for suspension or disbarment. The OCTC alleged that Respondent failed to comply with a court order directing him to return the Chengs' file. This allegation, however, has not been established by clear and convincing evidence.

On May 11, 2015, the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court ordered Respondent to produce the Chengs' file. The court order did not specify a timeframe or manner in which the file was to be turned over. Following that order, Respondent communicated with Milan's assistant. Since Milan did not have a brick and mortar office, and had a habit of personally serving documents to Respondent at Respondent's office, the parties agreed that Milan would pick up the file from Respondent's office. The file was subsequently copied and ready to be picked up by June 1, 2015 – approximately three weeks after the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court issued its order.

Under these circumstances, it appears that Respondent reasonably "produced" the Chengs' file pursuant to the court order. While, in retrospect, Respondent could have acted more directly and assertively, the evidence is not clear and convincing that Respondent willfully

[8] In its closing brief, the OCTC asserts that Respondent also violated section 6068, subdivision (m), by failing to keep the Chengs reasonably informed of significant developments. Since this charge was not alleged in the NDC, the court declines to make such a finding in culpability.

violated or disobeyed the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court's order. Consequently, Count Five is dismissed with prejudice, as it has not been established by clear and convincing evidence

Aggravation[9]

Multiple Acts (Std. 1.5(b))

Respondent's multiple acts of misconduct warrant moderate consideration in aggravation.

Uncharged Misconduct (Std. 1.5(h))

Although evidence of uncharged misconduct may not be used as an independent ground of discipline, it may be considered in aggravation where the "evidence was elicited for the relevant purpose of inquiring into the cause of the charged misconduct [and where the finding of uncharged misconduct] was based on [the respondent's] own testimony. . . ." (*Edwards v. State Bar* (1990) 52 Cal.3d 28, 36.) Here, the OCTC requests that the court assign aggravation based on uncharged criminal misconduct involving Respondent's failure to notify the Chengs of significant events, including not informing the Chengs that they had been sanctioned and were required to pay $3,885. Since the bulk of the testimony on this issue came from Mrs. Cheng, the court declines to assign any weight in aggravation for uncharged misconduct relating to Respondent's failure to notify the Chengs of significant events.

Significant Client Harm (Std. 1.5(j))

Respondent's misconduct caused significant harm to the Chengs. Due to his misconduct, the Chengs were forced to pay sanctions in the amount of $3,885 and hire new counsel to try to rectify the situation. Consequently, Respondent's significant harm to the Chengs warrants considerable weight in aggravation.

Mitigation

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[9] All references to standards (Std.) are to the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, title IV, Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.

No Prior Record of Discipline (Std. 1.6(a))

Respondent was admitted to practice law in California in 1985, and has no prior record of discipline. His more than 28 years of discipline-free conduct prior to the present misconduct warrants highly significant consideration in mitigation. (*Friedman v. State Bar* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 235, 245 [more than 20 years of practice with an unblemished record is highly significant mitigation].)

Extreme Emotional Difficulties (Std. 1.6(d))

Respondent has recently faced considerable turmoil in his personal life. In 2015, he and his wife experienced a trial separation, and they divorced in 2016. While the court is sympathetic to these difficult events, they do not warrant consideration in mitigation because they did not occur at the same time as the present misconduct and it has not been established by expert testimony that they were directly responsible for the present misconduct. (*In re Demergian* (1989) 48 Cal.3d 284, 294; *In re Naney* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 197; *In the Matter of Spaith* (Review Dept. 1996) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 511, 519.)

Discussion

The purpose of State Bar disciplinary proceedings is not to punish the attorney, but to protect the public, to preserve public confidence in the profession, and to maintain the highest possible professional standards for attorneys. (*Chadwick v. State Bar* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 103, 111; *Cooper v. State Bar* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1016, 1025; Std. 1.1.)

In determining the level of discipline, the court looks first to the standards for guidance. (*Drociak v. State Bar* (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1085, 1090; *In the Matter of Koehler* (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 615, 628). Second, the court looks to decisional law. (*Snyder v. State Bar* (1990) 49 Cal.3d 1302, 1310-1311; *In the Matter of Taylor* (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 563, 580.)

Standard 1.7 provides that if a member commits two or more acts of misconduct and the Standards specify different sanctions for each act, the most severe sanction must be imposed. Standard 1.7 further states that if aggravating or mitigating circumstances are found, they should be considered alone and in balance with any additional aggravating or mitigating factors.

In this case, the standards call for the imposition of a sanction ranging from reproval to suspension. Standard 2.7(c) provides that suspension or reproval is the presumed sanction for performance, communication, or withdrawal violations, which are limited in scope or time. The degree of the sanction depends on the extent of the misconduct and the degree of harm to the client or clients.

The standards, however, "do not mandate a specific discipline." (*In the Matter of Van Sickle* (Review Dept. 2006) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 980, 994.) It has long been held that the court is "not bound to follow the standards in talismanic fashion. As the final and independent arbiter of attorney discipline, [the Supreme Court is] permitted to temper the letter of the law with considerations peculiar to the offense and the offender." (*Howard v. State Bar* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 215, 221-222.) Yet, while the standards are not binding, they are entitled to great weight. (*In re Silverton* (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 92.)

The OCTC argued, among other things, that Respondent should be actually suspended for 90 days. Respondent did not advocate a specific level of discipline in his closing brief, but requested that his mitigation be taken into consideration, including his extensive period of practice with no prior record of discipline.

Turning to the applicable case law, the court finds guidance in *Harris v. State Bar* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1082; and *King v. State Bar* (1990) 52 Cal.3d 307. In *Harris*, an attorney failed to perform and improperly withdrew from representation in one matter over a four-year period, resulting in financial harm to the client. The attorney, who had practiced for over 10 years

without discipline, suffered from typhoid fever at the time of the misconduct, but displayed indifference and a lack of candor. The Supreme Court imposed a 90-day actual suspension.

In *King*, the attorney abandoned two clients, failed to forward their files promptly to successor counsel, and gave false assurances to one of the clients regarding the status of his case. The attorney demonstrated a failure to accept responsibility for his actions and to appreciate the severity of his misconduct. The attorney's misconduct also resulted in an $84,000 default judgment against his client. In mitigation, the attorney had no prior record of discipline in the fifteen years prior to his misconduct. Additionally, he was experiencing depression and financial difficulties, and was going through a marital dissolution. The Supreme Court ordered that the attorney be suspended for four years, stayed, with four-years' probation, and three-months' actual suspension.

The present case is less severe than *Harris* or *King*. The present misconduct involved one client rather than two, as was the case in *King*. And although *Harris* also involved a single client matter, the misconduct in that matter continued over four years. By contrast, the present misconduct spanned approximately eight months.

Moreover, *Harris* and *King*, involved fairly extensive findings in aggravation. Unlike those cases, here the OCTC did not assert that Respondent lacked insight and/or candor, or failed to accept any responsibility for his actions. The aggravation in this case is limited to multiple acts and client harm. Client harm weighs heavily in this court's analysis, and although it is significant here, it does not rival the extent of harm in either *Harris* (case settled for substantially less than originally worth) or *King* ($84,000 default judgment against clients). Further, it is balanced by mitigation for Respondent's 28 years of discipline-free conduct, which is nearly double the period of discipline-free conduct found in *Harris* (10 years) and *King* (15 years).

In view of Respondent's misconduct, the case law, the standards, and the mitigating and aggravating factors, this court concludes that the present case warrants a lower level of discipline than that imposed in *Harris* and *King*. Accordingly, this court finds, among other things, that a 60-day period of suspension and until full payment of restitution is appropriate, and provides adequate protection for the courts, the public, and the legal profession.

Recommendations

It is recommended that respondent **Frederick James Wood**, State Bar Number 121994, be suspended from the practice of law in California for one year, that execution of that period of suspension be stayed, and that Respondent be placed on probation[10] for a period of two years subject to the following conditions:

1. Respondent is suspended from the practice of law for a minimum of the first 60 days of probation, and will remain suspended until the following requirements are satisfied:

    i. He makes restitution to Alan and Eliza Cheng in the amount of $3,885 plus 10 percent interest per year from August 22, 2015 (or reimburses the Client Security Fund, to the extent of any payment from the fund to Alan and Eliza Cheng, in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6140.5) and furnish proof to the State Bar's Office of Probation in Los Angeles;

    ii. He pays the $250 sanction award issued on February 3, 2015, by the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court in the matter of *Brenda Sparks v. Alan Cheng and Eliza Cheng*, case No. 14CVP-0105;

    iii. If Respondent remains suspended for 90 days or more as a result of not satisfying the preceding conditions, he must also comply with rule 9.20 of the California Rules of Court and perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 120 and 130 calendar days, respectively, after the effective date of this order. Failure to do so may result in disbarment or suspension; and

    iv. If Respondent remains suspended for two years or more as a result of not satisfying the preceding conditions, he must also provide satisfactory proof to the State Bar Court of his rehabilitation, fitness to practice, and present learning and ability in the general law before his actual suspension will be terminated. (Rules

[10] The probation period will commence on the effective date of the Supreme Court order imposing discipline in this matter. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.18.)

Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, std. 1.2(c)(1).)

2. Respondent must comply with the provisions of the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and all of the conditions of Respondent's probation.

3. Within 10 days of any change in the information required to be maintained on the membership records of the State Bar pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6002.1, subdivision (a), including Respondent's current office address and telephone number, or if no office is maintained, the address to be used for State Bar purposes, Respondent must report such change in writing to the Membership Records Office and the State Bar's Office of Probation.

4. Respondent must submit written quarterly reports to the Office of Probation on each January 10, April 10, July 10, and October 10 of the period of probation. Under penalty of perjury, Respondent must state whether Respondent has complied with the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and all of the conditions of Respondent's probation during the preceding calendar quarter. In addition to all quarterly reports, a final report, containing the same information, is due no earlier than 20 days before the last day of the probation period and no later than the last day of the probation period.

5. Subject to the assertion of applicable privileges, Respondent must answer fully, promptly, and truthfully, any inquiries of the Office of Probation or any probation monitor that are directed to Respondent personally or in writing, relating to whether Respondent is complying or has complied with Respondent's probation conditions.

6. Within one year after the effective date of the discipline herein, Respondent must submit to the Office of Probation satisfactory evidence of completion of the State Bar's Ethics School and passage of the test given at the end of that session. This requirement is separate from any Minimum Continuing Legal Education requirement, and Respondent will not receive Minimum Continuing Legal Education credit for attending Ethics School. (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 3201.)

7. Within 30 days after the effective date of discipline, Respondent must contact the Office of Probation and schedule a meeting with Respondent's assigned probation deputy to discuss these terms and conditions of probation. Upon the direction of the Office of Probation, Respondent must meet with the probation deputy either in person or by telephone. During the period of probation, Respondent must promptly meet with the probation deputy as directed and upon request.

At the expiration of the probation period, if Respondent has complied with all conditions of probation, Respondent will be relieved of the stayed suspension.

Multi-State Professional Responsibility Examination

It is recommended that Respondent be ordered to take and pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE) within one year after the effective date of the Supreme Court order imposing discipline in this matter, or during the period of Respondent's suspension, whichever is longer and provide satisfactory proof of such passage to the State Bar's Office of Probation in Los Angeles within the same period.

Costs

It is recommended that costs be awarded to the OCTC in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6086.10, and are enforceable both as provided in Business and Professions Code section 6140.7 and as a money judgment.

Dated: February 13, 2018

Cynthia Valenzuela
CYNTHIA VALENZUELA
Judge of the State Bar Court

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on February 13, 2018, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):

DECISION

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:

☒ by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:

FREDERICK JAMES WOOD
7070 MORRO RD STE C
ATASCADERO, CA 93422 - 4434

☒ by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

DREW D. MASSEY, Enforcement, Los Angeles

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on February 13, 2018.

Erick Estrada
Case Administrator
State Bar Court