State Bar Court of California **Hearing Department** PUBLIC MATTER Los Angeles **ACTUAL SUSPENSION** Counsel For The State Bar Case Number(s): For Court use only 17-C-02768-DFM Stacia L. Johns **Deputy Trial Counsel** FILED 845 South Figueroa Street Los Angeles, CA 90017 (213) 765-1004 DEC 12 2017 STATE BAR COURT Bar # 292446 CLERK'S OFFICE LOS ANGELES In Pro Per Respondent **Shane Andres Reed** Reed & Associates P.O. Box 452 Jacksonville, OR 97530 (541) 899-1085 Submitted to: Assigned Judge Bar # 158382 STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING In the Matter of: SHANE ANDRES REED **ACTUAL SUSPENSION** ☑ PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED Bar # 158382 A Member of the State Bar of California

Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.

A. Parties' Acknowledgments:

- (1) Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted June 8, 1992.
- (2) The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
- (3) All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 15 pages, not including the order.
- (4) A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."

kwiktag* 026 803 917

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(Effective July 1, 2015)

(Respondent)

(Do	not writ	te above this line.)
(5)	Co Lav	nclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of w ".
(6)	The "Su	e parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading apporting Authority."
(7)	No per	more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any nding investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
(8)	Pa ₃ 614	yment of Disciplinary Costs—Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 40.7. (Check one option only):
		Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 5.130, Rules of Procedure. Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: three billing cycles following the effective date of the Supreme Court order. (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs". Costs are entirely waived.
	Misc	ravating Circumstances [Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional conduct, standards 1.2(h) & 1.5]. Facts supporting aggravating circumstances are ired.
(1)	□ (a)	Prior record of discipline State Bar Court case # of prior case
	(b)	☐ Date prior discipline effective
	(c)	Rules of Professional Conduct/ State Bar Act violations:
	(d)	☐ Degree of prior discipline
	(e)	If Respondent has two or more incidents of prior discipline, use space provided below.
(2)	☒	Intentional/Bad Faith/Dishonesty: Respondent's misconduct was dishonest, intentional, or surrounded by, or followed by bad faith. See page 11.
(3)		Misrepresentation: Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by, or followed by, misrepresentation.
(4)		Concealment: Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by, or followed by, concealment.
(5)		Overreaching: Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by, or followed by, overreaching.
(6)		Uncharged Violations: Respondent's conduct involves uncharged violations of the Business and Professions Code, or the Rules of Professional Conduct.

(Do n	ot write	e above this line.)
(7)		Trust Violation: Trust funds or property were involved and Respondent refused or was unable to account to the client or person who was the object of the misconduct for improper conduct toward said funds or property.
(8)	×	Harm: Respondent's misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public, or the administration of justice. See page 11.
(9)		Indifference: Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for the
(10)		consequences of his or her misconduct. Candor/Lack of Cooperation: Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims of his/her misconduct, or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigations or proceedings.
(11)		Multiple Acts: Respondent's current misconduct evidences multiple acts of wrongdoing.
(12)		Pattern: Respondent's current misconduct demonstrates a pattern of misconduct.
(13)		Restitution: Respondent failed to make restitution.
(14)		Vulnerable Victim: The victim(s) of Respondent's misconduct was/were highly vulnerable.
(15)		No aggravating circumstances are involved.
Addi	tiona	al aggravating circumstances:
	P	rior Record of Discipline in a Foreign Jurisdiciton: See pages 11-12 and Exhibit 1.
		ating Circumstances [see standards 1.2(i) & 1.6]. Facts supporting mitigating mstances are required.
(1)		No Prior Discipline: Respondent has no prior record of discipline over many years of practice coupled with present misconduct which is not likely to recur.
(2)		No Harm: Respondent did not harm the client, the public, or the administration of justice.
(3)		Candor/Cooperation: Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and cooperation with the victims of his/her misconduct or `to the State Bar during disciplinary investigations and proceedings.
(4)		Remorse: Respondent promptly took objective steps demonstrating spontaneous remorse and recognition of the wrongdoing, which steps were designed to timely atone for any consequences of his/her misconduct.
(5)		Restitution: Respondent paid \$ on in restitution to without the threat or force of disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings.
(6)		Delay: These disciplinary proceedings were excessively delayed. The delay is not attributable to Respondent and the delay prejudiced him/her.
(7)		Good Faith: Respondent acted with a good faith belief that was honestly held and objectively reasonable.
(8)		Emotional/Physical Difficulties: At the time of the stipulated act or acts of professional misconduct Respondent suffered extreme emotional difficulties or physical or mental disabilities which expert testimony would establish was directly responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities were not the

(Do no	ot write	e abov	e this li	ne.)				
		proc or di	luct of isabilit	any illegal conduct by the member, such as illegal drug or substance abuse, and the difficulties ties no longer pose a risk that Respondent will commit misconduct.				
(9)		whic	Severe Financial Stress: At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered from severe financial stress which resulted from circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond his/her control and which were directly responsible for the misconduct.					
(10)		Fam pers	illy Pr onal li	oblems: At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered extreme difficulties in his/her ife which were other than emotional or physical in nature.				
(11)		Goo in th	d Cha e lega	aracter: Respondent's extraordinarily good character is attested to by a wide range of references all and general communities who are aware of the full extent of his/her misconduct.				
(12)		Reh follo	Rehabilitation: Considerable time has passed since the acts of professional misconduct occurred followed by convincing proof of subsequent rehabilitation.					
(13)		Но г	nitiga	ting circumstances are involved.				
Addi	tiona	al mit	igatin	g circumstances:				
	P	retria	i Stip	ulation: See page 12.				
D. D	isci	plin	e :					
(1) Stayed Suspension:				spension:				
	(a)		Resp	condent must be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years.				
		i.		and until Respondent shows proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of rehabilitation and fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the general law pursuant to standard 1.2(c)(1) Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.				
		ii.		and until Respondent pays restitution as set forth in the Financial Conditions form attached to this stipulation.				
		iii.		and until Respondent does the following:				
	(b)	\boxtimes	The a	above-referenced suspension is stayed.				
(2)	\boxtimes	Prot	ation	:				
	Res date	ponder of the	ent mu e Sup	ust be placed on probation for a period of three years , which will commence upon the effective preme Court order in this matter. (See rule 9.18, California Rules of Court)				
(3)	\boxtimes	Actu	ıal Su	spension:				
	(a)	\boxtimes	Resp of tw	oondent must be actually suspended from the practice of law in the State of California for a period years .				
		i.		and until Respondent shows proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of rehabilitation and fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the general law pursuant to standard 1.2(c)(1), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct				
		ii.		and until Respondent pays restitution as set forth in the Financial Conditions form attached to this stipulation.				

(Do no	t write	above	this line.)			
(10)		The following conditions are attached hereto and incorporated:				
			Substance Abuse Conditions		Law Office Management Conditions	
			Medical Conditions	\boxtimes	Financial Conditions	
F. O	ther	Con	ditions Negotiated by the Parties	i:		
(1)		Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination: Respondent must provide proof of passage of the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination ("MPRE"), administered by the National Conference of Bar Examiners, to the Office of Probation during the period of actual suspension or within one year, whichever period is longer. Failure to pass the MPRE results in actual suspension without further hearing until passage. But see rule 9.10(b), California Rules of Court, and rule 5.162(A) & (E), Rules of Procedure.				
		. 🗆 N	No MPRE recommended. Reason:			
(2)	\boxtimes	Cali	fornia Rules of Court, and perform the acts	s speci	must comply with the requirements of rule 9.20 , fied in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 e date of the Supreme Court's Order in this matter.	
(3)		days perfe	s or more, he/she must comply with the red	quirement (c)	If Respondent remains actually suspended for 90 ents of rule 9.20 , California Rules of Court, and of that rule within 120 and 130 calendar days, Court's Order in this matter.	
(4)		perio	dit for Interim Suspension [conviction rood of his/her interim suspension toward the mencement of interim suspension:	eferral e stipul	cases only]: Respondent will be credited for the ated period of actual suspension. Date of	
(5)		Oth	er Conditions:			

	r of: res Reed		Case Number(s): 17-C-02768-DFM		
nancial (Conditions				<u> </u>
paye or an	ondent must pay rest e(s) listed below. If the y portion of the princip	itution (including the pring the Client Security Fund (pal amount(s) listed belo cable interest and costs.	"CSF") has rei	mbursed one or more of	the pave
Payee		Principal Amount	11	nterest Accrues From	
					_
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Proba	ation not later than Int Restitution Paym Condent must pay the		tion on the pay	ment schedule set forth	n below. F
Responder Respon	provide satisfactory p nerwise directed by th ition (or period of repr	proof of payment to the Core of Probation. No Proval), Respondent must including interest, in full.	o later than 30 make any nec	days prior to the expira	tion of the
Respi must as oth proba the pa	provide satisfactory p nerwise directed by th ition (or period of repr	proof of payment to the Cone Office of Probation. Noval), Respondent must including interest, in full.	o later than 30 make any nec	days prior to the expira	tion of the
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		If Resp	pondent maining	fails to pay any balance is due a	installment as and payable in	s described above, mmediately.	or as may be modified by	the State Bar Court,
C.	Clic	ent Fur	nds Cer	tificate				4
		☐ 1.	report	, Respondent m	ust file with ea	ach required report	ng the period covered by a a certificate from Respon ved by the Office of Proba	dent and/or a certified
			Ca	alifornia, at a bra	inch located v	oank account in a b within the State of 0 ' Funds Account";	ank authorized to do busi California, and that such a	ness in the State of ccount is designated
			b. Re	espondent has k	ept and main	tained the following	j :	
			i.	A written ledge 1. the name			alf funds are held that sets	forth:
							eceived on behalf of such	client:
							ach disbursement made o	
				client; and				
				4. the curren				
			ii.			ient trust fund acco	unt that sets forth:	
				1. the name				
				3. the curren			ch debit and credit; and,	
			iii.				each client trust account;	and
			iv.				ii), and (iii), above, and if	
					tween the mo	onthly total balance	s reflected in (i), (ii), and (
				espondent has necifies:	naintained a v	vritten journal of se	curities or other properties	s held for clients that
			i.	each item of s	ecurity and p	roperty held;		
			ü.			f the security or pro	perty is held;	
			iii.	the date of rec	eipt of the se	curity or property;		
			iv.			e security or prope		
			٧.	the person to	whom the sec	curity or property w	as distributed.	
		2.	covere Office	ed by a report, R	espondent m that reporting	ust so state under period. In this circ	erty or securities during the penalty of perjury in the recumstance, Respondent r	port filed with the
		· 3.		equirements of the		are in addition to the	ose set forth in rule 4-100	, Rules of

d. Client Trust Accounting School

Within one (1) year of the effective date of the discipline herein, Respondent must supply to the Office of Probation satisfactory proof of attendance at a session of the Ethics School Client Trust Accounting School, within the same period of time, and passage of the test given at the end of that session.

ATTACHMENT TO

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION

IN THE MATTER OF:

SHANE ANDRES REED

CASE NUMBER:

17-C-02768-DFM

FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense for which he was convicted involved moral turpitude.

Case No. 17-C-02768 (Conviction Proceedings)

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND IN CONVICTION PROCEEDING:

- 1. This is a proceeding pursuant to sections 6101 and 6102 of the Business and Professions Code and rule 9.10 of the California Rules of Court.
- 2. On January 8, 2015, the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Oregon filed an Information charging respondent with one count of violation of 26 of the United States Code section 7203 [failure to pay income tax], a misdemeanor.
- 3. On May 13, 2015, respondent pled guilty to one misdemeanor count of failure to pay income tax for tax years 2007, 2008, and 2009, in violation of 26 United States Code section 7203 [failure to pay income tax].
- 4. On May 13, 2015, Respondent was sentenced to five years' probation with conditions including 250 hours of volunteer work and an assessment of \$25. No restitution was ordered.
- 5. On August 17, 2017, the Review Department of the State Bar Court issued an order referring the matter to the Hearing Department for a hearing and decision recommending the discipline to be imposed in the event that the Hearing Department finds that the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense(s) for which respondent was convicted involved moral turpitude or other misconduct warranting discipline.

FACTS:

- 6. Respondent was practicing as a personal injury attorney when he filed federal income tax returns for 2006, 2007, and 2008.
- 7. The federal income tax returns for 2006, 2007, and 2008 collectively reflected that respondent earned a total of approximately \$880,000 in income for which he had a tax obligation of approximately \$129,000.
 - 8. Respondent failed to pay the taxes owed.

- 9. When the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") began communicating with respondent in writing, seeking to address his nonpayment of taxes as reflected on his tax returns, respondent was initially nonresponsive. Letters sent by the Collection Division were returned unopened. After some time, the IRS initiated formal collection proceedings.
- 10. Respondent was aware that the IRS would be seeking to levy identifiable bank accounts to secure payment of income taxes he had acknowledged he owed by the filing of income tax returns.
- 11. In 2009, respondent began using his client trust account ("CTA") to retain earned fees. Knowing that the IRS would be hesitant to levy an attorney's CTA, respondent sheltered his income by knowingly and intentionally leaving earned fees in the CTA. Periodically, and without regard to when fees were earned, respondent accessed earned fees by writing checks to himself from the CTA, which were later cashed and used for personal expenses.
- 12. Respondent continued to commingle earned fees with client funds in his CTA through 2010 and 2011.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

13. The facts and circumstances surrounding the above-described violation involved moral turpitude.

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

Intentional Misconduct, Bad Faith or Dishonesty (Std. 1.5(d)): Respondent knowingly and intentionally used his client trust account to shelter earnings from potential collections by the IRS, thereby committing an act of moral turpitude.

Significant Harm to Client, Public or Administration of Justice (Std. 1.5(j)): Respondent's failure to pay income tax caused public harm. (See *In the Matter of Kreitenberg* (Review Dept. 2002) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 469, 475 [public harm is an aggravating factor where an attorney fails to pay income tax].)

Prior Record of Discipline in a Foreign Jurisdiction: Respondent has one prior record of discipline in Oregon. In 2007, respondent was reprimanded for two violations of the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct: ORPC 8.4(a)(3) [misrepresentation] and 7.5(c)(1) [misleading firm name]. Respondent violated ORPC 8.4(a)(3) [misrepresentation] by signing his client's name to a release of claims without informing the opposing party that he had signed the release on behalf of the client as the client's attorney in fact. Respondent violated 7.5(c)(1) [misleading firm name] by advertising that he was in a firm with "associates" when he was the only attorney. Respondent stipulated to facts, conclusions of law, and discipline consisting of a reprimand. While respondent was not disciplined in California for this misconduct, it is still considered a prior record of discipline for purposes of aggravation because there is a record of the underlying facts surrounding the misconduct. (See In the Matter of Jeffers (Review Dept. 1994) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 211, 224 [records from any jurisdiction stated in Business and Professions Code 6049.1 are prior records of discipline and may be considered aggravating where there is a record of the factual underpinnings from the foreign jurisdiction's discipline].) This unreported record of discipline from Oregon has been referred to the Intake

Department of the Office of Chief Trial Counsel and may result in a further disciplinary matter. See Exhibit 1.

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

Pretrial Stipulation: Respondent is entitled to mitigation for entering into a pretrial stipulation as to facts and conclusions of law, thereby obviating the need for trial and saving State Bar resources. (Silva v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1071, 1079 [where mitigation credit was given for entering into a stipulation as to facts and culpability].) Respondent has also acknowledged his misconduct.

AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.

The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct "set forth a means for determining the appropriate disciplinary sanction in a particular case and to ensure consistency across cases dealing with similar misconduct and surrounding circumstances." (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, std. 1.1. All further references to standards are to this source.) The standards help fulfill the primary purposes of discipline, which include: protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; maintenance of the highest professional standards; and preservation of public confidence in the legal profession. (See std. 1.1; *In re Morse* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 184, 205.)

Although not binding, the standards are entitled to "great weight" and should be followed "whenever possible" in determining level of discipline. (In re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 92, quoting In re Brown (1995) 12 Cal.4th 205, 220 and In re Young (1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 267, fn. 11.) Adherence to the standards in the great majority of cases serves the valuable purpose of eliminating disparity and assuring consistency, that is, the imposition of similar attorney discipline for instances of similar attorney misconduct. (In re Naney (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 190.) If a recommendation is at the high end or low end of a standard, an explanation must be given as to how the recommendation was reached. (Std. 1.1.) "Any disciplinary recommendation that deviates from the Standards must include clear reasons for the departure." (Std. 1.1; Blair v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 762, 776, fn. 5.)

In determining whether to impose a sanction greater or less than that specified in a given standard, in addition to the factors set forth in the specific standard, consideration is to be given to the primary purposes of discipline; the balancing of all aggravating and mitigating circumstances; the type of misconduct at issue; whether the client, public, legal system or profession was harmed; and the member's willingness and ability to conform to ethical responsibilities in the future. (Stds. 1.7(b) and (c).)

Respondent's culpability in this proceeding is conclusively established by the record of his conviction (Bus. And Prof. Code section 6101(a); In re Crooks (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1090, 1097.) Respondent is presumed to have committed all elements of the crime of which he was convicted. (In re Duggan (1976) 17 Cal.3d 416, 423; In the Matter of Respondent O (Review Dept. 1993) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 581, 588.)

The facts and circumstances surrounding Respondent's misdemeanor conviction for violation of United States Code section 7203 [failure to pay income tax] involved moral turpitude due to respondent's dishonest conduct discussed below. The sanction most applicable to respondent's misconduct is found under Standard 2.15(c), which provides: "Disbarment or actual suspension is the presumed sanction for final conviction of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude."

In aggravation, respondent engaged in dishonest conduct and caused public harm. Respondent used his client trust account ("CTA") to retain earned fees knowing that the IRS would be hesitant to levy an attorney's CTA. This conduct occurred from 2009 to 2011. By intentionally sheltering his income from the IRS's collection efforts in the CTA, respondent engaged in acts of moral turpitude. His failure to pay income tax also caused harm to the public.

In light of the foregoing, discipline consisting of two years' actual suspension and until respondent provides proof satisfactory to the State Bar of his rehabilitation, fitness to practice, and present learning and ability pursuant to Standard 1.2(c)(1) is appropriate to protect the public, the courts, and the legal profession; to maintain high professional standards by attorneys; and to preserve public confidence in the legal profession.

This level of discipline is consistent with case law. In *In re Chernik* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 467, the attorney was convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States by impeding the lawful function of the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), in violation of 18 United States Code section 371. Specifically, the attorney illegally used backdated documents in a tax shelter scheme to allocate partnership losses to a partner prior to his entry into the partnership. The court found that the attorney's conviction involved moral turpitude. The court also noted that the attorney had 20 years of discipline-free practice. In that matter, the Supreme Court imposed discipline consisting of three years' stayed suspension, three years' probation subject to conditions, including the condition that the attorney be actually suspended for one year.

Like the attorney in *Chernik*, the facts and circumstances surrounding respondent's conviction involve acts of dishonesty constituting moral turpitude. However, unlike in *Chernik*, there is significant additional aggravation in the instant matter. While the court in *Chernik* noted that the attorney had 20 years of discipline-free practice, respondent has a prior record of discipline from 2007 in Oregon. Further, respondent intentionally shielded his income from IRS collection efforts by maintaining his income in his client trust account for several years. Respondent's use of his client trust account in the commission of the crime impugns the credibility of attorneys and the legitimacy of client trust accounts. In addition, respondent's failure to pay income tax caused public harm and placed entrusted funds at risk. Therefore, it is appropriate to impose a level of discipline substantially greater than the level of discipline imposed in *Chernik*.

In light of the foregoing, discipline consisting of two years' actual suspension and until respondent provides proof satisfactory to the State Bar of his rehabilitation, fitness to practice, and present learning and ability pursuant to Standard 1.2(c)(1) is appropriate to protect the public, the courts, and the legal profession; to maintain high professional standards by attorneys; and to preserve public confidence in the legal profession.

COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.

Respondent acknowledges that the Office of Chief Trial Counsel has informed respondent that as of November 14, 2017, the discipline costs in this matter are \$2,629. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.

EXCLUSION FROM MINIMUM CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION ("MCLE") CREDIT Respondent may <u>not</u> receive MCLE credit for completion of State Bar Ethics School, State Bar Client Trust Accounting School, and/or any other educational course(s) to be ordered as a condition of reproval or suspension. (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 3201.)

(Do not write above this line.)				
In the Matter of:	Case number(s):			
Shane Andres Reed	17-C-02768-DFM			

SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES

By their signatures each of the recitati Conclusions of Lav	below, the parties and their counsel, as a one and each of the terms and conditions or and Disposition	pplicable, signify their agreement with of this Stipulation Re Fact,
11/27/11		Shane Andres Reed
Date /	Resident's Signature	Print Name
12/4/2017	Deputy Trial Chunsel's Stenature	Stacia L. Johns Print Name

n the Matter of:	Case Number(s):
hane Andres Reed	17-C-02768-DFM
iane Andres Reed	17-C-02700-DFWI

ACTUAL SUSPENSION ORDER

Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any, is GRANTED without prejudice, and:

- The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
- The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
- All Hearing dates are vacated.

The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58(E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)

12/12/17

Date

DONALD F. MILES

Judge of the State Bar Court



True Copy Certificate

I certify that the attached documents consisting of 8 pages, are true and correct copies from the Oregon State Bar membership file or files of:

> Shane A. Reed, Bar No. 961597.

Regulatory Services

By Sergio Hernandez Date August 25, 2017 **Public Records Coordinator Oregon State Bar**

1	IN TH	E SUPREME COURT			
2	OF THE STATE OF OREGON				
3	In re:	}			
4	Complaint as to the Conduct of	Case No. 06-111			
5	SHANE A. REED,) ORDER APPROVING STIPULATION			
6	Accused.) FOR DISCIPLINE)			
7					
8	This matter having been heard up	pon the Stipulation for Discipline entered into by Shane			
9	A. Reed (hereinafter, "Accused") and t	the Oregon State Bar, and good cause appearing, it is			
10	hereby				
11	ORDERED that the stipulation be	etween the parties is approved. The Accused is publicly			
12	reprimanded for violation of RPC 8.4(a)((3) and RPC 7.5(c)(1).			
13 14	DATED this 19 day of 1	glenber 2007.			
15		\sim 4			
16		Hop. Jill A. Tanner			
17		State Disciplinary Board Chairperson			
18					
19		R. Paul Frasier, Region 3			
20		Disciplinary Board Chairperson			
21					
22					
23					
24					
25					

1	IN THE SUP	REME COURT SEP 1 3 2007			
2	OF THE STATE OF OREGON				
3	In re:	DISCIPLINARY BOARD			
4	Complaint as to the Conduct of) Case No. 06-111			
5	SHANE A. REED,) STIPULATION FOR			
6	Accused.) DISCIPLINE)			
7)			
8	Shane A. Reed, attorney at law, (her	einafter, "Accused") and the Oregon State Bar			
9	(hereinafter, "Bar"), hereby stipulate to the foll	owing matters pursuant to Oregon State Bar Rule			
10	of Procedure 3.6(c).				
11		1.			
12	The Bar was created and exists by virtu	e of the laws of the State of Oregon and is, and at			
13	all times mentioned herein was, authorized to c	arry out the provisions of ORS Chapter 9, relating			
14	to the discipline of attorneys.				
15	:	2.			
16	The Accused was admitted by the Or	regon Supreme Court to the practice of law in			
17	Oregon on May 3, 1996, and has been a member	er of the Oregon State Bar continuously since that			
18	time, having his office and place of business in	Jackson County, Oregon.			
19	;	3.			
20	The Accused enters into this Stipulatio	n for Discipline freely, voluntarily, and with the			
21	advice of counsel. This Stipulation for Discipl	ine is made under the restrictions of Bar Rule of			
22	Procedure 3.6(h).				
23	i	1.			
24	On October 20, 2006, the State Profes	sional Responsibility Board authorized a formal			
25	disciplinary proceeding against the Accused	for alleged violations of RPC 8.4(a)(3), RPC			

1	7.1(a)(1), and RPC 7.5(c)(1). The parties intend that this stipulation set forth all relevant facts
2	violations and the agreed-upon sanction as a final disposition of this proceeding.
3	FACTS AND VIOLATIONS
4	5.
5	On or about August 3, 2003, Adam Angel (hereinafter, "Angel") was involved in a motor
6	vehicle accident with an uninsured motorist. On or about August 13, 2003, Angel retained the
7	Accused to pursue claims for alleged personal and other injuries sustained and related to the
8	accident.
9	6.
10	On or about November 4, 2004, the Accused filed a civil complaint against Unitrin
11	Insurance Company, Adam Angel v Unitrin Insurance Company, Jackson County Circuit Cour
12	Case No. 043932L1 (hereinafter, "Court Action"). In or about December 2005, the parties agreed to
13	settle the Court Action. Pursuant to the terms of settlement, the Accused's client was required to
14	sign a release of all claims.
15	7.
16	On or about December 26, 2005, pursuant to a power of attorney provided to the Accused
17	by his client, the Accused signed his client's name to a release of all claims in favor of Unitrin
18	Insurance Company (hereinafter, Unitrin") and other persons. The Accused delivered the signed
19	release to representatives of Unitrin. The signature purported to be that of his client. The Accused
20	did not disclose to Unitrin and its representatives, either on the release or otherwise, that the
21	Accused's client did not sign the release or that the Accused had signed the client's name as the
22	client's attorney in fact.
23	8.
24	The Accused admits that the aforesaid conduct constitutes a misrepresentation in
25	violation of RPC 8.4(a)(3) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

ı	у.
2	Prior to and between January 2005 and November 2006, the Accused conducted his lav
3	practice with the names "Law Offices of Shane Reed & Associates," "Law Offices of Reed &
4	Associates," and similar names. The Accused used the names on his firm letterhead and other
5	documents, and advertised his firm name and services in writing using the names. At all materia
6	times, the Accused was the only lawyer in the Accused's law firm.
7	10.
8	The Accused admits that the aforesaid conduct constitutes practicing law under a name
9	that was misleading as to the identity of the lawyer or lawyers practicing under such name in
10	violation of RPC 7.5(c)(1) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Upon further factual inquiry
11	the parties agree that the alleged violation of RPC 7.1(a)(1) as set forth in the Bar's Second
12	Cause of Complaint, upon the approval of this stipulation, is dismissed.
13	<u>SANCTION</u>
14	11.
15	The Accused and the Bar agree that in fashioning an appropriate sanction, the ABA
16	Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter, "Standards") are considered. The
17	Standards require that the Accused's conduct be analyzed by the following factors: (1) the
18	ethical duty violated; (2) the attorney's mental state; (3) the actual or potential injury; and (4) the
19	existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Standards, §3.0.
20	a. Duty violated. In violating RPC 8.4(a)(3) and RPC 7.5(c)(1), the Accused
21	violated a duty to the profession. Standards, §7.0.
22	b. Mental state. "Knowledge" is the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant
23	circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective to accomplish a
24	particular result. "Negligence" is the failure of a lawyer to heed a substantial risk

that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, which failure is a deviation

	from the standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation.
	Standards, p. 7. The Accused knowingly signed the release with the client's name
	and did not disclose to opposing counsel that the signature was not that of the
	client. The Accused was negligent in failing to understand that he could not use
	the phrase "& Associates" when no other lawyers were part of his law firm.
c.	Injury. The Standards define "injury" as harm to the client, the public, the legal
	system or the profession that results from a lawyer's conduct. "Potential injury" is
	harm to the client, the public, the legal system, or the profession that is reasonably
	foreseeable at the time of the lawyer's conduct, and which, but for some
	intervening factor or event, would probably have resulted from the lawyer's
	misconduct. Standards, p. 7.
	The Accused caused potential injury to opposing counsel and his client,
	and the profession. Opposing counsel relied on the representation that the
	signature appearing on the release was that of the Accused's client and was
	denied any opportunity to determine whether the Accused's signing for the client
	was sufficient or valid. There was also potential injury to the profession in that the
	pubic could have been misled by the Accused's advertised law firm name.
d.	Aggravating factors. "Aggravating factors" are considerations that increase the
	degree of discipline to be imposed. Standards, §9.22. There are multiple offenses.
	Standards, §9.22(d). The Accused has substantial experience in the practice of
	law. He was admitted to practice in 1996. Standards, §9.22(i).
e.	Mitigating factors. "Mitigating factors" are considerations that may decrease the
	degree of discipline to be imposed. Standards, §9.32. The Accused has no prior
	record of discipline. Standards, §9.32(a). There is an absence of dishonest
	d.

motives. The Accused held a power of attorney signed by the client upon which

1	he relied as the authority to sign his client's name. Standards, §9.32(b). The
2	Accused has acknowledged his misconduct and cooperated in the investigation
3	and the resolution of this case. Standards, §9.22(e). He regrets the misconduct
4	Standards, §9.32(m). The Accused has also changed his practices in signing
5	documents for clients and disclosing the authority by which he does so. He has
6	also changed the name of his firm to comply with the rules of professional
7	conduct. Standards, §9.32(j).
8	12.
9	The Standards provide that suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly
10	engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes injury or
11	potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system. Standard s, §7.2. Reprimand is
12	generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty
13	owed as a professional and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal
14	system. Standards, §7.3.
15	13.
16	Oregon case law suggests that a reprimand is an appropriate sanction in this case. See,
17	e.g., In re Sims, 284 Or 37, 584 P2d 765 (1978) (reprimand for violation of former DR 1-
18	102(A)(3) [current RPC 8.4(a)(3)] when lawyer signed client's name to document and then
19	notarized the signature); In re Shilling, 9 DB Rptr 53 (1995) (reprimand for violation of former
20	DR 1-102(A)(3) [current RPC 8.4(a)(3)] when lawyer procured notarization of signature on
21	affidavit that was not signed in notary's presence). See also, In re Sussman and Tanner, 241 Or
22	246, 405 P2d 355 (1965) (public censure where lawyers identified themselves as partners when
23	they only shared office space).
24	///

///

1	I, Shane A. Reed, being first duly sworn, say that I am the Accused in the above-entitled		
2	proceeding and that I attest that the statements contained in the stipulation are true and correct as I verily believe.		
3			
4			
5	Signif 1/ Reed		
6	Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of, 2007.		
7			
8	OFFICIAL SEAL		
9	ALEJANDRINA VALDEZ Notary Public for Oregon NOTARY PUBLIC-OREGON COMMISSION NO. 378784 My commission expires:		
10	A MY COMMISSION EXPIRES MAR. 22, 2008		
11			
12	I, Jane E. Angus, being first duly sworn, say that I am Assistant Disciplinary Counsel for the Oregon State Bar and that I attest that I have reviewed the foregoing Stipulation for Discipline and that the sanction was approved by the SPRB for submission to the Disciplinary		
13			
14	Board on the 17th day of August, 2007.		
15			
16	Jane E. Angus		
17			
18	Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th day of 5eptember, 2007.		
19			
20	OFFICIALSEN Karen L. Duncan		
21	KAREN L DUNCAM Notary Public for Oregon WOTARY PUBLIC-OREGON OUMASSION NO. 410185 Notary Public for Oregon My commission expires: Nov. 24, 2010		
22	INTEGRALISSION EXPIRES NOVEMBER 24, 2010 G		
23			
24			

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on December 12, 2017, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:

by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:

SHANE A. REED REED & ASSOCIATES P O BOX 452 JACKSONVILLE, OR 97530

by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

STACIA L. JOHNS, Enforcement, Los Angeles

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on December 12, 2017.

Louisa Ayrapetyan
Case Administrator
State Bar Court