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## State Bar Court of California kwiktag® 241 070 630 **Hearing Department** Los Angeles STAYED SUSPENSION Counsel for the State Bar Case Number(s): For Court use only 17-O-05575 Andrew J. Vasicek **PUBLIC MATTER Deputy Trial Counsel** 845 South Figueroa Street Los Angeles, California 90017-2515 FILED (213) 765-1336 OCT 19 2018 Bar # 297430 STATE BAR COURT In Pro Per Respondent CLERK'S OFFICE LOS ANGELES Dorinda J. Myers 91 Sunrise Dr. Rancho Mirage, CA 92270-3879 Submitted to: Settlement Judge Bar # 257503 STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND In the Matter of: DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING **DORINDA JO MYERS** STAYED SUSPENSION; NO ACTUAL SUSPENSION Bar # 257503 ☐ PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED A Member of the State Bar of California (Respondent)

Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.

# A. Parties' Acknowledgments:

- (1) Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted October 13, 2008.
- (2) The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
- (3) All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of **14** pages, not including the order.
- (4) A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
- (5) Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law."

(Effective July 1, 2018)

Stayed Suspension

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(6)	Tł "S	The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."		
(7)	No pe	No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.		
(8)	Pa 61	Payment of Disciplinary Costs—Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. It is recommended that (check one option only):		
		а	osts be awarded to the State Bar in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6086.10, and are enforceable both as provided in Business and Professions Code section 6140.7 and as a mone digment.	
	Ø	aı ju	osts be awarded to the State Bar in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6086.10 and are enforceable both as provided in Business and Professions Code section 6140.7 and as a mone dgment. One-third of the costs must be paid with Respondent's membership fees for each of the llowing years: 2019, 2020, 2021.	
		lf Si	Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified in writing by the late Bar or the State Bar Court, the remaining balance will be due and payable immediately.	
		C	osts are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs."	
		C	osts are entirely waived.	
Mis	Aggi con uire	duc	ting Circumstances [Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional t, standards 1.2(h) & 1.5]. Facts supporting aggravating circumstances are	
(1)		Pric	or record of discipline:	
	(a)		State Bar Court case # of prior case:	
	(b)		Date prior discipline effective:	
	(c)		Rules of Professional Conduct/ State Bar Act violations:	
	(d)		Degree of prior discipline:	
	(e)		If Respondent has two or more incidents of prior discipline, use space provided below.	
2)		Intentional/Bad Faith/Dishonesty: Respondent's misconduct was dishonest, intentional, or surrounded by, or followed by bad faith.		
3)		Misrepresentation: Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by, or followed by misrepresentation.		
4)		Con	cealment: Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by, or followed by concealment.	
5)		Overreaching: Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by, or followed by overreaching.		
6)		Uncharged Violations: Respondent's conduct involves uncharged violations of the Business and Professions Code, or the Rules of Professional Conduct.		

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(7)		<b>Trust Violation</b> : Trust funds or property were involved and Respondent refused or was unable to account to the client or person who was the object of the misconduct for improper conduct toward said funds or property.
(8)	$\boxtimes$	Harm: Respondent's misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public, or the administration of justice. See page 10.
(9)		Indifference: Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for the consequences of Respondent's misconduct.
(10)		Candor/Lack of Cooperation: Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims of Respondent's misconduct, or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigations or proceedings.
(11)	$\boxtimes$	Multiple Acts: Respondent's current misconduct evidences multiple acts of wrongdoing. See page 10.
(12)		Pattern: Respondent's current misconduct demonstrates a pattern of misconduct.
(13)		Restitution: Respondent failed to make restitution.
(14)	$\boxtimes$	Vulnerable Victim: The victim(s) of Respondent's misconduct was/were highly vulnerable. See page 10.
(15)		No aggravating circumstances are involved.
C. N	/litig	ating Circumstances [Standards 1.2(i) & 1.6]. Facts supporting mitigating stances are required.
(1)	$\boxtimes$	No Prior Discipline: Respondent has no prior record of discipline over many years of practice coupled with present misconduct which is not likely to recur. See page 10.
(2)		No Harm: Respondent did not harm the client, the public, or the administration of justice.
(3)		Candor/Cooperation: Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and cooperation with the victims of Respondent's misconduct or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigations and proceedings.
(4)		<b>Remorse:</b> Respondent promptly took objective steps demonstrating spontaneous remorse and recognition of the wrongdoing, which steps were designed to timely atone for any consequences of Respondent's misconduct.
(5)		<b>Restitution:</b> Respondent paid \$ on in restitution to without the threat or force of disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings.
(6)		Delay: These disciplinary proceedings were expensively delayed. The delay is not excluded to
(7)		<b>Delay:</b> These disciplinary proceedings were excessively delayed. The delay is not attributable to Respondent and the delay prejudiced Respondent.
		Respondent and the delay prejudiced Respondent.  Good Faith: Respondent acted with a good faith belief that was honestly held and objectively reasonable.

	would establish was directly responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities were not the product of any illegal conduct by Respondent, such as illegal drug or substance abuse, and the difficulties or disabilities no longer pose a risk that Respondent will commit misconduct.	
	<b>Severe Financial Stress:</b> At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered from severe financial stress which resulted from circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond Respondent's control and which were directly responsible for the misconduct.	
	Family Problems: At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered extreme difficulties in Respondent's personal life which were other than emotional or physical in nature.	
$\boxtimes$	Good Character: Respondent's extraordinarily good character is attested to by a wide range of references in the legal and general communities who are aware of the full extent of Respondent's misconduct. See page 10.	
	<b>Rehabilitation:</b> Considerable time has passed since the acts of professional misconduct occurred followed by subsequent rehabilitation.	
	No mitigating circumstances are involved.	
ition	al mitigating circumstances:	
Trial	Stipulation. See page 11.	
Reco	ommended Discipline:	
Stayed Suspension:		
Re:	spondent is suspended from the practice of law for <b>one year</b> , the execution of that suspension is stayed, and spondent is placed on probation for <b>two years</b> with the following conditions.	
	Review Rules of Professional Conduct: Within 30 days after the effective date of the Supreme Court order imposing discipline in this matter, Respondent must (1) read the California Rules of Professional Conduct (Rules of Professional Conduct) and Business and Professions Code sections 6067, 6068, and 6103 through 6126, and (2) provide a declaration, under penalty of perjury, attesting to Respondent's compliance with this requirement, to the State Bar's Office of Probation in Los Angeles (Office of Probation) with Respondent's first quarterly report.	
$\boxtimes$	Comply with State Bar Act, Rules of Professional Conduct, and Probation Conditions: Respondent must comply with the provisions of the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and all conditions of Respondent's probation.	
	Maintain Valid Official Membership Address and Other Required Contact Information: Within 30 days after the effective date of the Supreme Court order imposing discipline in this matter, Respondent must make certain that the State Bar Attorney Regulation and Consumer Resources Office (ARCR) has Respondent's current office address, email address, and telephone number. If Respondent does not maintain an office, Respondent must provide the mailing address, email address, and telephone number to be used for State Bar purposes. Respondent must report, in writing, any change in the above information to ARCR, within ten (10) days after such change, in the manner required by that office.	
	Meet and Cooperate with Office of Probation: Within 15 days after the effective date of the Supreme Court order imposing discipline in this matter, Respondent must schedule a meeting with Respondent's assigned probation case specialist to discuss the terms and conditions of Respondent's discipline and, within 30 days after the effective date of the court's order, must participate in such meeting. Unless otherwise instructed by the Office of Probation, Respondent may meet with the probation case specialist in	
	Trial Reco	

person or by telephone. During the probation period, Respondent must promptly meet with representatives of the Office of Probation as requested by it and, subject to the assertion of applicable privileges, must fully, promptly, and truthfully answer any inquiries by it and provide to it any other information requested by it.

- (5) State Bar Court Retains Jurisdiction/Appear Before and Cooperate with State Bar Court: During Respondent's probation period, the State Bar Court retains jurisdiction over Respondent to address issues concerning compliance with probation conditions. During this period, Respondent must appear before the State Bar Court as required by the court or by the Office of Probation after written notice mailed to Respondent's official membership address, as provided above. Subject to the assertion of applicable privileges, Respondent must fully, promptly, and truthfully answer any inquiries by the court and must provide any other information the court requests.
- (6) Quarterly and Final Reports:
  - a. Deadlines for Reports. Respondent must submit written quarterly reports to the Office of Probation no later than each January 10 (covering October 1 through December 31 of the prior year), April 10 (covering January 1 through March 31), July 10 (covering April 1 through June 30), and October 10 (covering July 1 through September 30) within the period of probation. If the first report would cover less than 30 days, that report must be submitted on the next quarter date and cover the extended deadline. In addition to all quarterly reports, Respondent must submit a final report no earlier than ten (10) days before the last day of the probation period and no later than the last day of the probation period.
  - b. Contents of Reports. Respondent must answer, under penalty of perjury, all inquiries contained in the quarterly report form provided by the Office of Probation, including stating whether Respondent has complied with the State Bar Act and the Rules of Professional Conduct during the applicable quarter or period. All reports must be: (1) submitted on the form provided by the Office of Probation; (2) signed and dated after the completion of the period for which the report is being submitted (except for the final report); (3) filled out completely and signed under penalty of perjury; and (4) submitted to the Office of Probation on or before each report's due date.
  - c. Submission of Reports. All reports must be submitted by: (1) fax or email to the Office of Probation; (2) personal delivery to the Office of Probation; (3) certified mail, return receipt requested, to the Office of Probation (postmarked on or before the due date); or (4) other tracked-service provider, such as Federal Express or United Parcel Service, etc. (physically delivered to such provider on or before the due date).
  - d. Proof of Compliance. Respondent is directed to maintain proof of Respondent's compliance with the above requirements for each such report for a minimum of one year after either the period of probation or the period of Respondent's actual suspension has ended, whichever is longer. Respondent is required to present such proof upon request by the State Bar, the Office of Probation, or the State Bar Court.
- (7) State Bar Ethics School: Within one year after the effective date of the Supreme Court order imposing discipline in this matter, Respondent must submit to the Office of Probation satisfactory evidence of completion of the State Bar Ethics School and passage of the test given at the end of that session. This requirement is separate from any Minimum Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) requirement, and Respondent will not receive MCLE credit for attending this session. If Respondent provides satisfactory evidence of completion of the Ethics School after the date of this stipulation but before the effective date of the Supreme Court's order in this matter, Respondent will nonetheless receive credit for such evidence toward Respondent's duty to comply with this condition.
- (8) State Bar Ethics School Not Recommended: It is not recommended that Respondent be ordered to attend the State Bar Ethics School because

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(9)		State Bar Client Trust Accounting School: Within one year after the effective date of the Supreme Court order imposing discipline in this matter, Respondent must submit to the Office of Probation satisfactory evidence of completion of the State Bar Client Trust Accounting School and passage of the test given at the end of that session. This requirement is separate from any Minimum Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) requirement, and Respondent will not receive MCLE credit for attending this session. If Respondent provides satisfactory evidence of completion of the Client Trust Accounting School after the date of this stipulation but before the effective date of the Supreme Court's order in this matter, Respondent will nonetheless receive credit for such evidence toward Respondent's duty to comply with this condition.		
(10)		Minimum Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Courses – California Legal Ethics [Alternative to State Bar Ethics School for Out-of-State Residents]: Because Respondent resides outside of California, within after the effective date of the Supreme Court order imposing discipline in this matter, Respondent must either submit to the Office of Probation satisfactory evidence of completion of the State Bar Ethics School and passage of the test given at the end of that session or, in the alternative, complete hours of California Minimum Continuing Legal Education-approved participatory activity in California legal ethics and provide proof of such completion to the Office of Probation. This requirement is separate from any MCLE requirement, and Respondent will not receive MCLE credit for this activity. If Respondent provides satisfactory evidence of completion of the Ethics School or the hours of legal education described above, completed after the date of this stipulation but before the effective date of the Supreme Court's order in this matter, Respondent will nonetheless receive credit for such evidence toward Respondent's duty to comply with this condition.		
(11)		<b>Criminal Probation:</b> Respondent must comply with all probation conditions imposed in the underlying criminal matter and must report such compliance under penalty of perjury in all quarterly and final reports submitted to the Office of Probation covering any portion of the period of the criminal probation. In each quarterly and final report, if Respondent has an assigned criminal probation officer, Respondent must provide the name and current contact information for that criminal probation officer. If the criminal probation was successfully completed during the period covered by a quarterly or final report, that fact must be reported by Respondent in such report and satisfactory evidence of such fact must be provided with it. If, at any time before or during the period of probation, Respondent's criminal probation is revoked, Respondent is sanctioned by the criminal court, or Respondent's status is otherwise changed due to any alleged violation of the criminal probation conditions by Respondent, Respondent must submit the criminal court records regarding any such action with Respondent's next quarterly or final report.		
(12)		Minimum Continuing Legal Education (MCLE): Within after the effective date of the Supreme Court order imposing discipline in this matter, Respondent must complete hour(s) of California Minimum Continuing Legal Education-approved participatory activity in SELECT ONE and must provide proof of such completion to the Office of Probation. This requirement is separate from any MCLE requirement, and Respondent will not receive MCLE credit for this activity. If Respondent provides satisfactory evidence of completion of the hours of legal education described above, completed after the date of this stipulation but before the effective date of the Supreme Court's order in this matter, Respondent will nonetheless receive credit for such evidence toward Respondent's duty to comply with this condition.		
13)		Other: Respondent must also comply with the following additional conditions of probation:		
14)		<b>Proof of Compliance with Rule 9.20 Obligations:</b> Respondent is directed to maintain, for a minimum of one year after commencement of probation, proof of compliance with the Supreme Court's order that Respondent comply with the requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 9.20, subdivisions (a) and (c). Such proof must include: the names and addresses of all individuals and entities to whom Respondent sent notification pursuant to rule 9.20; a copy of each notification letter sent to each recipient; the original receipt or postal authority tracking document for each notification sent; the originals of all returned receipts and notifications of non-delivery; and a copy of the completed compliance affidavit filed by Respondent with the State Bar Court. Respondent is required to present such proof upon request by the State Bar, the Office of Probation, or the State Bar Court.		

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(15)		The following conditions are attached hereto and incorporated:	
		☐ Financial Conditions ☐ Medical Conditions	
		Substance Abuse Conditions	
matt	er. A	d of probation will commence on the effective date of the Supreme Court order imposing discipline in this it the expiration of the probation period, if Respondent has complied with all conditions of probation, the stayed suspension will be satisfied and that suspension will be terminated.	
E. C	Othe	r Requirements Negotiated by the Parties (Not Probation Conditions):	
(1)		Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination Within One Year: Respondent must take and pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination administered by the National Conference of Bar Examiners within one year after the effective date of the Supreme Court order imposing discipline in this matter and to provide satisfactory proof of such passage to the State Bar's Office of Probation within the same period. Failure to do so may result in suspension. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.10(b).) If Respondent provides satisfactory evidence of the taking and passage of the above examination after the date of this stipulation but before the effective date of the Supreme Court's order in this matter, Respondent will nonetheless receive credit for such evidence toward Respondent's duty to comply with this requirement.	
(2)		<b>Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination Requirement Not Recommended:</b> It is not recommended that Respondent be ordered to take and pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination because	
(3)		Other Requirements: It is further recommended that Respondent be ordered to comply with the following additional requirements:	

## **ATTACHMENT TO**

# STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION

IN THE MATTER OF:

**DORINDA JO MYERS** 

CASE NUMBER:

17-O-05575

### FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that she is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct.

# Case No. 17-O-05575 (Complainant: Rose Sarkisian)

#### **FACTS:**

- 1. Respondent, Dorinda J. Myers, was admitted to the practice of law in California on October 13, 2008.
- 2. In November 2012, Rose Sarkisian, a 79-year old woman, invested \$82,000 in a company called AG-Wise, Inc.
- 3. The agreement between Sarkisian and AG-Wise, Inc. required AG-Wise, Inc. to make a payment to Sarkisian on January 31, 2014.
- 4. AG-Wise, Inc. failed to make the required payment on her promissory note when it came due on January 31, 2014.
- 5. On March 21, 2014, Sarkisian hired respondent through a written fee agreement to file suit against AG-Wise, Inc. and/or its President, Eric Mireles.
- 6. Sarkisian paid respondent \$100 on March 21, 2014 and \$257 on August 25, 2014 as her "proportionate share" of a \$2,500 advanced retainer.
- 7. Respondent filed suit against AG-Wise, Inc. on July 31, 2014, as Case No. 14C0194, Ambrose v. AG-Wise.
- 8. Respondent failed to return multiple telephone calls from Sarkisian seeking updates about the status of the matter, from March 21, 2014 through August 2017, as well as two calls and two emails from Sarkisian's subsequent attorney, Jay Bloom, on or about August 2 and 4, 2017.
- 9. In or about August 18, 2017, respondent informed Sarkisian that Case No. 14C0194, *Ambrose v. AG-Wise*, had been filed. Respondent made extensive efforts to complete service of the lawsuit.
- 10. Mireles filed for bankruptcy and respondent represented Sarkisian's interests in the related adversarial proceedings in Bankruptcy Case No. 15-01135-A. These proceedings did not result in a

stay in Ambrose v. AG-Wise, but respondent's questioning of Mireles produced information demonstrating that AG-Wise, Inc. was no longer an active corporation and lacked any assets.

- 11. As a result of the bankruptcy proceedings, Mireles' civil liabilities were discharged. Respondent then determined that there was no longer anything to be gained from continuing litigation in Ambrose v. AG-Wise. Respondent failed to take any further action in Ambrose v. AG-Wise.
- 12. After inaction by respondent, the court sanctioned respondent \$100 and dismissed *Ambrose* v. AG-Wise on or about June 14, 2016, for failure to prosecute.
  - 13. Respondent was not aware of the \$100 sanction against her until September 2018.
- 14. Respondent failed to inform Sarkisian that, due to Mireles' bankruptcy, there were no assets to be reached in *Ambrose v. AG-Wise*, as well as that *Ambrose v. AG-Wise* had been dismissed.
- 15. Respondent closed her private practice in December 2015, but failed to inform Sarkisian of the change.
- 16. State Bar investigator Sherri Carter sent respondent letters on December 26, 2017 and January 12, 2018 seeking a response, as well as telephone and email messages for respondent on February 21 and 23, 2018.
- 17. Respondent failed to respond to any of these attempts to contact her, each of which utilized the contact information from her official member record.
  - 18. As of October 5, 2018, respondent paid the \$100 sanction that was levied against her.

#### CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

- 19. On or about March 21, 2014, Rose Sarkisian employed respondent to perform legal services, namely to file and prosecute a suit against AG-Wise, Inc., which respondent intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly failed to perform with competence, in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A), by failing to take appropriate steps to either prevent the case's dismissal by the court or to properly dismiss the case after conferring with Ms. Sarkisian.
- 20. Respondent failed to respond promptly to multiple reasonable status inquiries made by telephone by respondent's client, Rose Sarkisian, between March 21, 2014 and August 2017 that respondent received in a matter in which respondent had agreed to provide legal services, in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(m). Respondent also failed to respond to two emails and two telephone calls from Ms. Sarkisian's subsequent attorney, Jay Bloom, on or about August 2 and 4, 2017, seeking an update as to the status of the matter.
- 21. Respondent failed to keep respondent's client, Rose Sarkisian, reasonably informed of significant developments in a matter in which respondent had agreed to provide legal services, in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(m), by failing to inform the client of the following:
  - a. The closure of her practice in or about December 2015;
  - b. The dismissal and outcome of Sarkisian's case on or about June 14, 2016;

- c. The outcome of the defendant's bankruptcy matter and how it affected Sarkisian's civil case.
- 22. Respondent failed to cooperate and participate in a disciplinary investigation pending against respondent by failing to provide a substantive response to the State Bar's letters of December 26, 2017 and January 12, 2018, which respondent received, that requested respondent's response to the allegations of misconduct being investigated in case no. 17-O-05575, in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(i). Respondent also failed to respond to a telephone message and email sent by the State Bar on February 21, 2018, as well as a telephone message and email sent by the State Bar on February 23, 2018.

### AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

Multiple Acts of Wrongdoing (Std. 1.5(b)): Respondent committed six separate acts of misconduct. (In the Matter of Bach (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 631, 646-7 [three acts of misconduct constitute multiple acts of misconduct].) Multiple acts of misconduct can be considered serious aggravation. (See, e.g., In the Matter of Valinoti (Review Dept.2002) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 498, 555.)

Significant Harm to Client, Public or Administration of Justice (Std. 1.5(j)): As a result of respondent's misconduct, Sarkisian was harmed. First, Sarkisian had to hire a new attorney to determine what was happening with her claim. (In the Matter of Aguiluz (Review Dept. 1992) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 32, 45 [needing to hire new attorney constitutes harm to client].) Second, although respondent filed a civil suit on Sarkisian's behalf and involved herself in the related bankruptcy, where she learned that AG-Wise, Inc. and Mireles lacked assets, the civil suit was dismissed and respondent took no further action to protect her client's interests or claims related to the unpaid debt. As a result, it is likely that those claims are now barred by the relevant statute of limitations (four years from January 31, 2014). (In the Matter of Dahlz (Review Dept. 2001) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 269, 283 [attorney's failure to perform resulting in lost cause of action is significant client harm]; In the Matter of Bach (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 631, 646 [loss of case constitutes significant harm, even if the amount of damages would have been relatively modest].)

Highly Vulnerable Victim (Std. 1.5(n)): Sarkisian was an elderly client who had just lost a very significant sum of money. Respondent took more money from Sarkisian with promises to seek redress on her behalf, but ultimately provided little of value to her client. (See *Recht v. State Bar of California* (1933) 218 Cal. 352, 355 ["The license to practice is not a license to mulct the unfortunate, but to assist in righting their wrongs, so far as humanly possible."].)

### MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

Lack of Prior Discipline (Std. 1.6(a)): Respondent has no prior record of discipline in approximately 10 years of practice in California.

Extraordinary Good Character (Std. 1.6(f)): Respondent produced three declarations from a wide-range of references in the legal and general communities. Each of these references stated that they are aware of the full extent of the misconduct alleged and attested to respondent's good character. Included among these declarations were descriptions of respondent's charitable works.

**Pre-Trial Stipulation:** By entering into this stipulation, respondent has now acknowledged misconduct and is entitled to mitigation for recognition of wrongdoing and saving the State Bar significant resources and time. (Silva-Vidor v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1071, 1079 [where mitigative credit was given for entering into a stipulation as to facts and culpability]; In the Matter of Spaith (Review Dept. 1996) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 511, 521 [where the attorney's stipulation to facts and culpability was held to be a mitigating circumstance].)

# AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.

The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct "set forth a means for determining the appropriate disciplinary sanction in a particular case and to ensure consistency across cases dealing with similar misconduct and surrounding circumstances." (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, std. 1.1. All further references to standards are to this source.) The standards help fulfill the primary purposes of discipline, which include: protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; maintenance of the highest professional standards; and preservation of public confidence in the legal profession. (See std. 1.1; *In re Morse* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 184, 205.)

Although not binding, the standards are entitled to "great weight" and should be followed "whenever possible" in determining level of discipline. (In re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 92, quoting In re Brown (1995) 12 Cal.4th 205, 220 and In re Young (1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 267, fn. 11.) Adherence to the standards in the great majority of cases serves the valuable purpose of eliminating disparity and assuring consistency, that is, the imposition of similar attorney discipline for instances of similar attorney misconduct. (In re Naney (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 190.) If a recommendation is at the high end or low end of a standard, an explanation must be given as to how the recommendation was reached. (Std. 1.1.) "Any disciplinary recommendation that deviates from the Standards must include clear reasons for the departure." (Std. 1.1; Blair v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 762, 776, fn. 5.)

In determining whether to impose a sanction greater or less than that specified in a given standard, in addition to the factors set forth in the specific standard, consideration is to be given to the primary purposes of discipline; the balancing of all aggravating and mitigating circumstances; the type of misconduct at issue; whether the client, public, legal system or profession was harmed; and the member's willingness and ability to conform to ethical responsibilities in the future. (Stds. 1.7(b) and (c).)

In this matter, respondent admits to committing multiple acts of professional misconduct. Standard 1.7(a) requires that where a respondent "commits two or more acts of misconduct and the Standards specify different sanctions for each act, the most severe sanction must be imposed."

In addition, Standard 1.7 (a) states that if a member commits two or more acts of misconduct and the Standards specify different sanctions for each act, the most severe sanction must be imposed. Respondent has committed multiple acts of professional misconduct by violating sections 6068(i) and 6068(m), as well as rule 3-110(A). Respondent violated section 6068(i) because she failed to respond in any way to the State Bar's attempts to contact her for a response to Sarkisian's complaint. Respondent violated section 6068(m) because she failed to respond to any of Sarkisian's or Bloom's inquiries into the status of the matter, even when critical events occurred such as the dismissal of Sarkisian's civil suit. Respondent violated Rule 3-110(A) because she permitted her client's case to be dismissed and took no further action to protect her client's interests or claims as she had been hired and paid to do.

Considering these violations, the most severe sanction for respondent's misconduct falls under Standard 2.7(c). Standard 2.7(c) provides that suspension or reproval is the presumed sanction for performance, communication, or withdrawal violations, which are limited in scope or time. The degree of sanction depends on the extent of the misconduct and the degree of harm to the client and, of course, we must also weigh the possible aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances. Based on these considerations, a one-year stayed suspension may be appropriate and is within the Standards.

Case law supports this result as well.

Although published, post-Silverton case law may at times be sparse, many recent cases make extensive use of pre-Silverton precedent as part of their analyses of the Standards and appropriate levels of discipline. For example, in In the Matter of Riordan (Review Dept. 2007) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 41, the court explicitly considered six pre-Silverton cases for guidance on the level of discipline question. In this matter, Riordan took on a single case which he was not fully prepared to handle and therefore allowed the criminal appeal to languish. His misconduct included being sanctioned and failing to report that sanction. In addition, the court found that, although his client was not ultimately harmed, the administration of justice was. On the other hand, the court observed that Riordan had been practicing for 17 years without incident and presented strong character witness evidence. Finally, while the court considered several pre-Silverton matters which tended to show that an actual suspension would normally be implicated based on the totality of this kind of misconduct, it ultimately concluded that the unique facts present in Riordan's case made a six-month stayed suspension more appropriate. (See also Van Sloten v. State Bar (1989) 48 Cal.3d 921 [six-month stayed suspension for attorney with no prior record of discipline in about five years of practice who was found culpable of violating his oath and abandoning his client in a single matter after performing some initial acts and directing client to hire a new attorney].)

Similarly, in *Colangelo v. State Bar* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1255, Colangelo was found culpable of failing to perform, failing to respond to status inquiries, failing to keep his client reasonably informed of the status of his matter, and failing to promptly return unearned fees. In addition, in four client matters, the court found Colangelo withdrew without taking reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his clients. However, the Supreme Court took particular note of the apparent lack of harm, the weakness of the evidence due the default State Bar proceedings, and Colangelo's epilepsy. As a result, it imposed a one-year stayed suspension.

In In the Matter of Aguiluz (Review Dept. 1992) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 32, the court found certain conflicts in the testimony about the circumstances surrounding the attorney-client relationship. However, the court determined that Aguiluz took initial steps to resolve his clients' case, but then intentionally ignored their instructions and abandoned the case without notifying them, returning their file, or shielding their rights from foreseeable prejudice. The court found mitigation in Aguiluz's emotional stress and community service, as well as from the short duration of misconduct, but found that he had not been practicing long enough to get credit for a lack of prior discipline. It found aggravation in his lack of insight and misrepresentations to clients, but insufficient evidence existed to demonstrate the extent of economic harm suffered by the clients arising out of Aguiluz's inattention. The court did observe that the fact they needed to hire a new attorney showed they were harmed to some degree. Aguiluz received a stayed suspension of one year.

Respondent's case borders on abandonment, but she has presented evidence to support the fact that significant work was done in Sarkisian's case in its earlier stages and has now acknowledged her misconduct. Further, although Sarkisian suffered a significant harm, that harm was primarily the result

of a third party and only exacerbated by respondent's misconduct. In addition, respondent presents less substantial mitigation than Riordan, and showed indifference or lack of insight in her failures to respond to her clients and the State Bar, aligning this matter more closely with this court's decisions to impose a one-year stayed suspension (e.g., Colangelo v. State Bar and In the Matter of Aguiluz).

Balancing the aggravation and mitigation in this case, a one-year stayed suspension is appropriate and ensures that respondent appreciates the seriousness of complying with her ethical duties and will also serve the purposes of discipline.

# COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.

Respondent acknowledges that the Office of Chief Trial Counsel has informed respondent that as of October 17, 2018, the discipline costs in this matter are \$3,857. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.

(Do not write above this line.)			
In the Matter of: DORINDA JO MYER	S	Case Number(s): 17-O-05575	
SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES			
By their signatures below, recitations and each of the	the parties and their counsel, as a terms and conditions of this Stipu	pplicable, signify their agreement with each of the lation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Disposition.	
10 17 18 Date	Respondent's Signature	Dorinda J. Myers Print Name	
Date	Respondent's Counsel Signature	Print Name	
/ <i>0//8/  8</i> Date	Deputy Trial Counsel's Signature	Andrew J. Vasicek Print Name	

(Do not write	above this line.)	
In the Ma DORINI	tter of: DA JO MYERS	Case Number(s): 17-O-05575
)	STAY	ED SUSPENSION ORDER
Finding the requested of	stipulation to be fair to the parties a dismissal of counts/charges, if any, is	nd that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the s GRANTED without prejudice, and:
		on are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the
15	The stipulated facts and disposition DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED	on are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the D to the Supreme Court.
K	All Hearing dates are vacated.	
Page 2, para "2020, 2021	agraph A.(8): the reference to t 1, and 2022":	he years "2019, 2020, 2021" is modified to read
stipulation. (S	See Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 5	oved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed led; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved .58(E) & (F).) The effective date of this disposition is the effective hally 30 days after the filed date of the Supreme Court order.
·	119/18	Dinacus La
Date		Judge of the State Bar Count

### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Court Specialist of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on October 19, 2018, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:

by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:

DORINDA J. MYERS 91 SUNRISE DR RANCHO MIRAGE, CA 92270 - 3879

by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

ANDREW J. VASICEK, Enforcement, Los Angeles

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on October 19, 2018.

Mazie Yip Court Specialist State Bar Court