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4	T: 213-236-3628 F: 213-471-4712	OCT 29 2018
5		STATE BAR COURT
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8	STATE BAR COURT	
9	HEARING DEPARTMENT – LOS ANGELES	
10	STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA	Case No.: 18-O-11297
11	Petitioner,	
12		NOTICE OF DEFENSE AND RESPONSE TO DISCIPLINARY CHARGES
13	VS.	IU DISCIPLINAR I CHARGES
14	ABRAHAM A. SANCHEZ SIQUIEROS	
15	Respondent.	
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18	TO THE LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA AND	
19	THEIR CHOSEN ATTORNEY OF RECORD, ROSS VISELMAN:	
20	COMES NOW, COUNSEL ABRAHAM A. SANCHEZ SIQUEIROS, on his own behalf	
21	and alleges as follows:	
22	INTRODUCCION AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND	
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24	The present case stems from a referral by the California Court of Appeals for the Second	
25	District. The actual clients did not complain to the State Bar, nor did they seek to mediate or	
26	arbitrate any dispute with respondent, despite respondent's advice that if they disagreed with or	
27	had a complain about the representation to go to the State Bar or seek some other form of action.	
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	RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY CHARGE	kwiktag* 241 070 684

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The allegations in the State Bar's complaint are not grounded in fact and even contravene the procedural record. The investigative process was almost nonexistent. After respondent answered the investigators requests and produced all files in his records, there was no follow up or interactive process with the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel regarding this matter.

The matter arises out of the representation of two clients, Maria Lourdes Razon-Chua and Patrick Aguiluz. The clients were sued for defamation and hired respondent on or about November 25, 2013 on a flat fee retainer agreement to defend them. The clients agreed to pay respondent's legal fees in instalment payments but they failed to do so on December 2013.

Respondent informed clients that legal services would not be rendered on their behalf unless they paid in accordance with the legal representation agreement.

On or about December 2013, the plaintiff in the defamation case, James Sacramento, filed a request for entry of default. The request was rejected by the court however, because the plaintiff was requesting punitive damages and had failed to serve a statement of damages.

The clients were informed of the court's rejection of the plaintiff's request for entry of default and chose not to make installments on their flat fee agreement. Mrs. Razon-Chua, specifically, reasoned that if the plaintiff did not have an attorney and was not able to prosecute the case, then she did not really need an attorney and chose not to pay. Mr. Aguiluz was aware of this fact, and that no legal services would be rendered on his behalf either. Mr. Aguiluz never offered to pay for his legal fees.

The plaintiff submitted multiple requests for entry of default thereafter, and on November 2014, a year after the clients hired respondent, the court erroneously granted the request for entry of default. Before this occurred, respondent, on numerous occasions, expressly advised the clients to file their response and not wait until the plaintiff entered their default or served the

statement of damages. However, the clients did not cure their breach of contract with respondent and did not make their payments.

The clients chose to wait and see if the plaintiff got it right against the express advice of respondent.

Respondent was also hired by Mrs. Razon-Chua on another defamation matter on or about November 2013, named Insider Productions LLC v. Razon-Chua. On that case, respondent filed several responsive pleadings for Mrs. Razon-Chua, and eliminated the vast majority of the plaintiff's cause of action through a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Mrs. Razon-Chua later substituted counsel and the case was settled.

If the clients had paid respondent would have filed for them without any issues. However, they never cured their breach and only contacted respondent after the court erroneously entered their default. Respondent met with the clients on or about December 2014, and agreed to represent them on new terms. However, the clients did not sign the new agreement that was sent to them and they did not send their payment.

The clients then did not contact respondent until the eve of trial but they would not sign a new agreement and they would not make payment. Mrs. Razon-Chau vacillated with filing for bankruptcy and Mr. Aguiluz never offered to pay and did not sign the new agreement.

Respondent offered to represent the co-defendants in the case, Mr. and Mrs. Tagoc, who had answered and were going to trial self-represented. The Tagocs hired respondent and respondent obtained a judgment in their favor after a six-day trial.

The judgment in favor of the Tagocs was directly beneficial to the clients because it involved the same incident. The Tagocs were also sued for defamation and respondent raised the defense that the Tagocs statements were true, or that the gist of their statements were true, which

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was that the plaintiff used intimidation and bullying to get paid for services that he had not delivered. These were the same statements that the clients had made regarding the plaintiff.

During the pendency of the trial, respondent again sent a new representation agreement to the clients and the clients did not sign it or make payment. Mrs. Razon-Chua decided to wait until after the trial to decide what she would do. All this time the clients were informed of the procedural deficiency of their entry of default.

After the trial the clients further refused to enter into a new representation agreement to vacate the entry of default and file their response. Respondent, as a good faith gesture, prepared their motions to vacate and reserved hearing dates with the court. However, respondent did not file for the clients because they did not sign their new fee agreements and did not make payment. The clients were expressly informed that if they did not sign and make payment, respondent could not and would not file for them.

On or about August of 2015, plaintiff filed a request for default judgment ex parte without giving notice to respondent. Respondent informed clients of this fact, and prepared new motions to vacate and a motion for request for sanctions against plaintiff's attorney. Respondent forwarded the motions to the clients and reserved a court hearing date, but the clients still did not sign the representation agreement and did not make payment, including for court fees.

The clients subsequently hired other representation, Mr. Eammon Jafari, to vacate their defaults. Mr. Jafari filed motions to vacate alleging that the clients were in default for respondent's failure to perform. Mr. Jafari was informed by respondent that the clients had breached their representation agreement in December of 2013 and that they had been expressly informed that no services would be performed on their behalf unless they signed a new

agreement and paid. Mr. Jafari was provided with the communications between respondent and the clients demonstrating this.

Mr. Jafari was also advised that it was not necessary to argue attorney fault in order to vacate the default because the law is very clear on the requirement of service of a statement of damages for entry of default on a complaint requesting punitive damages. Mr. Jafari however, was insistent that respondent submit a declaration of fault in support of his motions and threatened respondent with a State Bar complaint if respondent did not cooperate.

Mr. Jafari and the clients then committed a fraud on the court by submitting declarations and motions alleging misconduct by respondent. Mr. Jafari and the clients submitted a heavily redacted email conversation between to clients and respondent in order to mislead the court. Mr. Jafari and the clients blacked-out almost all the conversation and only left parts of sentences to give the impression that I was promising to file for the clients. However, the email conversations were the opposite of that; they expressly stated that no filing would occur until they signed a new agreement and paid.

The court vacated the entry of default and the default judgment because no statement of damages had been served. However, the court, in violation of respondent's constitutional right to due process, entered a judgment finding that respondent had committed constructive fraud against the clients. No notice was served on respondent regarding the motions to vacate or the court's order vacating and finding respondent to have committed fraud.

The plaintiff filed an appeal of the order vacating the default, arguing that the clients had chosen to remain in default. The appeal was frivolous given the clarity of the law regarding the necessity of service of statement of damages for entry of default on a complaint requesting punitive damages. The attorney for plaintiff did a disservice to his client by appealing, and Mr. Jafari opened the clients up to the appeal by unnecessarily and maliciously alleging respondent's fault in the motions to vacate.

The State Bar's allegations are grossly inaccurate and misrepresent the procedural record of the case. They are not the result of a serious and thorough investigation, but exclusively rely on the fraudulent misrepresentations of Mr. Jafari and the clients.

RESPONSE TO COUNT ONE

Case No. 18-O-11297 Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A) [Failure to Perform with Competence]

As stated above, respondent was not under the obligation to perform for clients since the clients breached the representation agreement, including, by falling to pay. The clients breached the agreement a few weeks after they agreed to its terms. The clients were expressly informed that respondent would not perform legal services for them unless they paid. Respondent engaged in discussions and negotiated new representation agreements with clients, but the clients did not sign the new agreements and did not make payment.

RESPONSE TO COUNT TWO

Case No. 18-O-11297 Business and Professions Code, section 6068(m) [Moral Turpitude – Misrepresentation to Client]

Respondent reserved several hearing dates with the court after preparing motions to vacate. Respondent sent these motions to the clients for their review, and as good faith gestures to demonstrate that the work had been done so that they would pay what they owed and respondent could proceed with the filing. New fee agreements were also sent to the clients. Respondent expressly informed the clients that if they did not sign the new agreements and make payment, respondent could not and would not file for them. New agreements were necessary because the original fee agreement had been breached and also called for a cross-complaint.

As stated above, the State Bar's investigation in this matter is grossly deficient and relies on the fraudulent declarations of Mr. Jafari and the clients. Such dates were reserved, but the clients did not meet their obligations and respondent could not perform for them.

RESPONSE TO COUNT THREE

Case No. 18-O-11297 Business and Professions Code, section 6106 [Moral Turpitude – Misrepresentation to Client]

Respondent repeats his response to count two in response to count three. Such hearing dates were reserved, and motions to vacate were prepared and sent to the clients for their review and for them to pay what they owed respondent. New fee agreements were also sent to the clients since they breached the original fee agreement of November 2013. The clients did not sign any other agreements with respondent beside the November 2013 agreement.

However, Mr. Jafari and the clients fraudulently stated to the court that they had entered into a new fee agreement with respondent. The clients presented the heavily redacted email in which they are refusing to sign the new agreement as evidence that they had signed the new agreement with the aid of Mr. Jafari.

RESPONSE TO COUNT FOUR

Case No. 18-O-11297 Business and Professions Code, section 6068(m) [Failure to Respond to Client Inquiries]

Again, the State Bar relies exclusively on the fraudulent statements of the clients and Mr. Jafari in making these allegations. They are not grounded on the record. Respondent has provided his complete file to the State Bar which demonstrates that these allegations are false.

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Respondent was in communication with the clients and promptly responded to their communications. Moreover, respondent took the time to make it abundantly clear to the clients that no filing on their behalf would take place unless they signed a new agreement and paid what they owed.

RESPONSE TO COUNT FIVE

Case No. 18-O-11297 Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(A)(2) [Improper Withdrawal from Employment]

The State Bar also exclusively relies on the fraudulent representations of Mr. Jafari and the clients in making this allegation. The clients were expressly informed that respondent would not perform legal services on their behalf unless they paid what they owed and singed a new fee agreement.

The State Bar's allegations are not factual and misstate that dates and dealings between respondent and the clients. As early as December 2013, respondent informed the clients that no services would be rendered unless they paid. On January 2014, a new fee agreement was negotiated with the clients but they did not sign it after they had agreed to its terms, and they did not perform by making payment. On or about March 2014, respondent advised clients to contact the State Bar if they believed that respondent was obligated to perform for them. On April 2014, respondent again expressly informed the clients that no services would be performed on their behalf unless they paid.

The State Bar relies on the fraudulent representations of Mr. Jafari and the clients, that the clients signed a new agreement in early 2015. However, this is not true, the clients only singed the November 2013 representation agreement. The clients and Mr. Jafari presented the

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heavily redacted email conversation in which the clients refuse to sign the new agreement as evidence that they singed the new agreement.

The State Bar has been made aware of this fact, but in gross violations of their duties as attorneys and prosecutors they continue to put forth these fraudulent allegations.

CONCLUSION

The clients hired respondent on November 2013, and breached their promises under the agreement on December 2013. Respondent discontinued work for the clients on December 2013. Several meetings and communications with the clients were had thereafter but there was no agreement reached as to the continuation of respondent's representation of the clients in the Sacramento case. Respondent made good faith efforts by preparing motions to vacate and reserved court dates to file motions on their behalf, but the clients never signed new agreements and did not pay.

Mrs. Razon-Chua decided to wait and see if Sacramento was able to enter a default against her. Respondent expressly advised the clients against this course of action. The clients were not in default until November 2014, and they still did not hire respondent after meeting on December 2014, nor on the eve of trial, nor on March 2015. Therefore, respondent was not obligated at any point to perform for them, and they were always apprised of the fact that respondent would not perform until they signed a new agreement and paid.

Respectfully submitted Dated October 29 ieiros Respo

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DECLARATION OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, over the age of eighteen, declare that [] I am / [] arn not a party to the within action, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on ______ 29 2019 , served the following document(s): Notice to Disciplinary Char esponse

by personal delivery:

Liselma Koss lounsel ficed Irial ! of California Figueroa S hes, CA st. 90017 net 105 A

[] other:

I declare under penalty of perjury at Los Angeles, California, on the date shown below, that the foregoing is true and correct.

29,2019 Dated: