Case Number(s): 11-O-13546
In the Matter of: Julie L. Plisinski, Bar 199585, A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Brooke A. Schafer, 1149 S. Hill Street
Los Angeles, CA 90015
Bar #194824
Counsel for Respondent: David C. Carr, Law Office of David Cameron Carr
530 B St Ste 1410
San Diego, CA 92101
Bar #124510
Submitted to:
Filed: October 27, 2011 State Bar Court Clerk’s Office Los Angeles
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted December 8, 1998.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 13 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
<<not>> checked. Costs are added to membership fee for calendar year following effective date of discipline (public reproval).
<<not>> checked. Case ineligible for costs (private reproval).
checked. Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: 2013 and 2014. (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
<<not>> checked. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs are entirely waived.
9. The parties understand that:
<<not>> checked. (a) A private reproval imposed on a respondent as a result of a stipulation approved by the Court prior to initiation of a State Bar Court proceeding is part of the respondent’s official State Bar membership records, but is not disclosed in response to public inquiries and is not reported on the State Bar’s web page. The record of the proceeding in which such a private reproval was imposed is not available to the public except as part of the record of any subsequent proceeding in which it is introduced as evidence of a prior record of discipline under the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar.
<<not>> checked. (b) A private reproval imposed on a respondent after initiation of a State Bar Court proceeding is part of the respondent’s official State Bar Membership records, is disclosed in response to public inquiries and is reported as a record of public discipline on the State Bar’s web page.
checked. (c) A public reproval imposed on a respondent is publicly available as part of the respondent’s official State Bar membership records, is disclosed in response to public inquiries and is reported as a record of public discipline on the State Bar’s web page.
See attached page.
RESTITUTION CONDITION
F. Respondent agrees to refund Lorne Olson the entire legal fee paid of
$5,990.00 on or before the 90th day following the date on which she signs this Stipulation. Said refund shall be certified or similar bank-issued official check, and shall be payable to Lorne Olson. Said check shall be delivered to the undersigned deputy trial counsel on or before the 90th day following the date Respondent signs this stipulation, at the following address:
BROOKE SCHAFER
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
1149 S. HILL STREET
LOS ANGELES, CA 90015
Moreover, Respondent agrees to retain a photo copy of said refund check
for the duration of this reproval period, and to produce it upon request by Office of the Chief Trial Counsel, Office of Probation or State Bar Court. Respondent understands that failure to comply with this restitution condition alone may be grounds for additional discipline.
Case Number(s): 11-O-13546
In the Matter of: Julie L. Pinski
Nolo Contendere Plea Stipulations to Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Disposition
The terms of pleading nolo contendere are set forth in the Business and Professions Code and the Rules of Procedures of the State Bar. The applicable provisions are set forth below:
Business and Professions Code § 6085.5 Disciplinary Charges; Pleas to Allegations
There are three kinds of pleas to the allegations of a notice of disciplinary charges or other pleading which initiates a disciplinary proceeding against a member:
(a) Admission of culpability.
(b) Denial of culpability.
(c) Nolo contendere, subject to the approval of the State Bar Court. The court shall ascertain whether the member completely understands that a plea of nolo contendere will be considered the same as an admission of culpability and that, upon a plea of nolo contendere, the court will find the member culpable. The legal effect of such a plea will be the same as that of an admission of culpability for all purposes, except that the plea and any admissions required by the court during any inquiry it makes as to the voluntariness of, or the factual basis for, the pleas, may not be used against the member as an admission in any civil suit based upon or growing out of the act upon which the disciplinary proceeding is based.
Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, rule 5.56. Stipulations to Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Disposition
“(A) Contents. A proposed stipulation to facts, conclusions of law, and disposition must comprise:
[¶] . . . [¶]
(5) a statement that the member either:
(a) admits the truth of the facts comprising the stipulation and admits culpability for misconduct; or
(b) pleads nolo contendere to those facts and misconduct;
[¶] . . . [¶]
(B) Plea of Nolo Contendere. If the member pleads nolo contendere, the stipulation must also show that the member understands that the plea is treated as an admission of the stipulated facts and an admission of culpability.”
I, the Respondent in this matter, have read the applicable provisions of Business and Professions Code section 6085.5 and rule 5.56 of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar. I plead nolo contendere to the charges set forth in this stipulation and I completely understand that my plea will be considered the same as an admission of culpability except as stated in Business and Professions Code section 6085.5(c).
Signed by: Julie L. Plisinski
Respondent: Julie L. Plisinski
Date: October 17, 2011
IN THE MATTER OF: State Bar No.
STATE BAR COURT CASE NUMBER:
ATTACHMENT TO
STIPULATION RE FACTS~ CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION
IN THE MATTER OF: Julie L. Plisinski
CASE NUMBER(S): 11-O-13546
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Respondent knowingly enters into a nolo contendre plea to the following facts and conclusions of law,
and agrees that the following can form the basis for discipline:
Case no. 11-O-13546 (Complainant: Lome Olson)
FACTS:
1. In December 2008, Lorne Olson ("Olson") hired Respondent for loan modification services for two rental houses Olson owned in Arizona; one in Scottsdale, the other ir~ Phoenix. Olson paid $2995.00 in advance for each loan modification, for a total of $5990.00. At the time Olson hired Respondent, Olson informed Respondent that neither of the Arizona properties were owner-occupied, and that in fact Olson resided in Texas.
2. Respondent had an assistant named Andy Olivarez. Most of Olson’s communications with Respondent’s office were with Olivarez. Respondent delegated to Olivarez most of the work gathering information and filling out Olson’s loan modification applications. After a delay while Olson attempted to work with his lender on his own, by November 2009 Olson requested Respondent work on his loan modifications again.
3. Respondent’s office submitted loan modification paperwork for both the Scottsdale and Phoenix properties in December 2009. A hardship letter submitted to Bank of America with the paperwork on the Scottsdale property indicated the Scottsdale property was a rental house. In mid-January 2010 Bank of America denied Olson’s loan modification application on the Scottsdale property as it was a rental house, not owner occupied.
4. In early January 2010, Respondent sent Olson a letter asking Olson to advise her if he still wanted her office to service his loan modifications. Olson did not respond to this letter, but Respondent’s office continued working on his loan modifications.
5. In late January 2010, after Bank of America denied Olson’s loan modification application, Olivarez advised Olson to submit a new loan modification application on the same Scottsdale property, and Olivarez questioned why Olson told Bank of America the house was not owner occupied.
6. In March 2010, Olivarez asked Olson for additional information for the loan modification application on the Phoenix house, serviced by Morgan Stanley. Olivarez reminded Olson that the forms should state the property was owner occupied. Olson questioned Olivarez as to how he could state this when he lived in Texas. Olivarez did not respond. In April Olson submitted the Morgan Stanley forms to Olivarez, but did not indicate the property was owner occupied.
7. In April 2010 Olson also sent Olivarez a new loan modification application for the Scottsdale property, to submit to Bank of America. Again Olivarez reminded Olson the application for the Scottsdale property should state it was "owner occupied," even though it was not. Olson submitted the application to Bank of America.
8. From time to time between late April 2010 to early July 2010 Olson checked on the status of both the Bank of America and the Morgan Stanley loan modification applications by emailing Olivarez. In fact, most of Olson’s communications with Respondent’s office during the entire period of representation was through email with Olivarez. Until June 19, 2010, Olivarez’s emails included a
signature line that Olivarez was "Director of Public Relations and Operations for the Law Offices of Julie L. Plisinski, PC."
9. On June 17, 2010, Respondent sent a letter to Olson stating, inter alia, that his application on the Scottsdale house was approved by Bank of America, and that he was approved for a payment of $634.04 per month. Respondent’s letter also stated "this concludes our representation of you." In reality, there were several problems with this letter. One, Bank of America had not approved Olson’s loan modification request. In addition, Respondent’s letter did not mention Olson’s pending application
with Morgan Stanley on the other property. Further, the letter was mailed to the Scottsdale house address, not Olson’s home address in Texas. Olson never received this June 17, 2010, letter.
10. Olivarez kept working on the Morgan Stanley application and Olson still considered
Respondent his attorney. On June 28, 2010, Olivarez submitted Olson’s loan modification paperwork to Morgan Stanley. In the accompanying hardship letter, which was part of the application packet, Ofivarez made two alterations. First, he changed the date from April 26, 2010, to June 28, 2010. Second, he added an additional sentence to the hardship letter which stated "This is my owner occupied home, PLEASE HELP!" Olson had not written the letter with these words, nor was he aware Olivarez
made these changes until Olson discovered it in August 2010.
11. On September 3, 2010, Olson terminated Respondent’s services by letter, and requested a refund of fees paid, citing among other things that Olivarez had altered his hardship letter without permission to state that the property was owner occupied, when Olivarez knew that was not the case.
12. Respondent received Olson’s September 3, 2010, letter, but never responded. At no time did Respondent provide an accounting or refund any of the fees she received from Olson.
13. Respondent believed she ended representation in mid-June 2010, however she did not properly withdraw, nor did she address continuation of representation for Olson’s other property. When Respondent and Olivarez parted ways in late June or July 2010, Respondent’s lack of organization resulted in her not knowing Olivarez kept one of the cases. During the entire period of representation Respondent did not properly supervise Olivarez’s work. "
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
14. By failing to supervise Olivarez such that: (a) Olivarez advised Olson to misrepresent that his two properties were owner occupied in loan documents, (b) Olivarez altered loan documents submitted to Bank of America, and (c) Olivarez kept working on Olson’s matters even after Respondent believed she had withdrawn, and by attempting to withdraw prior to conclusion of the work for which
Attachment Page 2
she was retained, and by not responding to Olson’s September 3, 2010, letter, Respondent recklessly and repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A).
15. By failing to refund unearned fees or to provide an accounting of fees earned, Respondent failed to render appropriate accounts to a client regarding all funds coming into Respondent’s possession, in wilful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-10003)(3). (E.g., In re Connor (Rev. Dept. 2008) 5 State Bar Ct. Rptr. 93).
PENDING PROCEEDINGS.
The disclosure date referred to, on page 2, paragraph A(7), was October 3,2011.
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.
Standards 1.3; 2.4(b)
ADDITIONAL FACTS SUPPORTING MITIGATION.
Candor/Cooperation. Respondent has been cooperative and is entitled to significant mitigating credit for accepting responsibility prior to filing of formal charges.
COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.
Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has informed respondent that as of October 3,2011, the prosecution costs in this matter are $2797.00. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.
RESPONDENT’S ACKNOWLEDGMENTS AS TO KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY ACTS
Respondent acknowledges that she enters into this nolo contendre plea to stipulation knowingly and voluntarily, and that she has had sufficient opportunity to consult with legal counsel and to consider the substance of the foregoing.
Case Number(s): 11-O-13546
In the Matter of: Julie L. Plisinski
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by: Julie L. Plisinski and David C. Carr and Brooke A. Schafer
Respondent: Julie L. Plisinski
Date: October 17, 2011
Respondent’s Counsel: David C. Carr
Date: October 18, 2011
Deputy Trial Counsel: Brooke A. Schafer
Date: October 20, 2011
Case Number(s): 11-O-13546
In the Matter of: Julie L. Plisinski
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any, is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AND THE REPROVAL IMPOSED.
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the REPROVAL IMPOSED.
<<not>> checked. All court dates in the Hearing Department are vacated.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58 (E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) Otherwise the stipulation shall be effective 15 days after service of this order.
Failure to comply with any conditions attached to this reproval man constitute cause for a separate proceeding for willful breach of rule 1-110, Rules of Professional Conduct.
Signed by: Richard A. Platel
Judge of the State Bar Court
Date: October 27, 2011
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and
County of Los Angeles, on, October 27, 2011, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:
DAVID C. CARR
LAW OFFICE OF DAVID CAMERON CARR
530 B ST STE 1410
SAN DIEGO, CA 92101
<<not>> checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
BROOKE SCHAFER, Enforcement, Los Angeles
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on October 27, 2011.
Signed by: Johnnie Lee Smith
Case Administrator
State Bar Court