State Bar Court of California
Hearing Department
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING DISBARMENT; ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE
ENROLLMENT
DISBARMENT
Case Number(s): 12-O-16056; 12-O-16391; 12-O-17223;
12-O-18127;
12-O-18133;
13-O-10114;13-O-10410;13-O-10572;13-O-10611;13-O-10693
In the Matter of: DIONNE MATEOS, Bar # 205959, A Member of
the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Mia R. Ellis, Bar #228235,
Counsel for Respondent: DIONNE MATEOS , Bar #205959,
Submitted to: Assigned Judge.
Filed: May 13, 2013.
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION
REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any
additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be
set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g.,
"Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law,"
"Supporting Authority," etc.
A. Parties' Acknowledgments:
1.
Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted December
22, 1999.
2.
The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained
herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the
Supreme Court.
3.
All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption
of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed
consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under
"Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 19 pages, not including
the order.
4.
A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or
causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5.
Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts
are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6.
The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level
of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7.
No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent
has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not
resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8.
Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of
Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
checked. Costs are awarded to the
State Bar.
<<not>> checked. Costs
are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial
Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs
are entirely waived.
9.
ORDER OF INACTIVE ENROLLMENT:
The parties are aware that if this stipulation is approved, the judge will
issue an order of inactive enrollment under Business and Professions Code
section 6007, subdivision (c)(4), and Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, rule
5.111(D)(1).
B. Aggravating Circumstances [for definition, see Standards for Attorney
Sanctions for Professional Misconduct, standard 1.2(b)]. Facts supporting aggravating
circumstances are required.
checked. (1) Prior record of
discipline
checked. (a) State Bar Court case # of prior case 09-O-101348,
09-O-15697, 10-O-05308, 10-O-09743, 10-O-10662, 11-O-10491.
checked. (b) Date prior discipline effective July 28, 2011.
checked. (c) Rules of Professional Conduct/ State Bar Act
violations: 3-110(A), 6068(m), 4-100(B)(3), 3-700(D)(1), 3-700(D)(2), 6068(i),
6103
checked. (d) Degree of prior discipline one (1) year
stayed suspension, one (1) year probation.
checked. (e) If Respondent has two or more incidents of
prior discipline, use space provided below.
Case Nos. 11-O-13347, et al. (S205941). Effective January 18, 2013.
Violations: Rules of Professional Conduct, rules 3-1 10(A), 3-700(D)(2), 4-100(B)(3),
3-700(A); State Bar Act, Business and Professions Code Sections 6068(i),
6068(m), 6106.3. Discipline: two (2) years actual suspension, three (3) years
probation.
Please see Stipulation attachment page 14 for additional facts regarding
prior record of discipline..
<<not>> checked. (2) Dishonesty:
Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by or followed by bad faith, dishonesty,
concealment, overreaching or other violations of the State Bar Act or Rules of
Professional Conduct.
<<not>> checked. (3) Trust
Violation: Trust funds or property were involved and Respondent refused or was
unable to account to the client or person who was the object of the misconduct
for improper conduct toward said funds or property.
checked. (4) Harm: Respondent's
misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public or the administration of
justice. Please see Stipulation attachment page 14.
<<not>> checked. (5) Indifference:
Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for
the consequences of his or her misconduct.
<<not>> checked. (6) Lack of
Cooperation: Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims
of his/her misconduct or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation or
proceedings.
checked. (7) Multiple/Pattern of
Misconduct: Respondent's current misconduct evidences multiple acts of
wrongdoing or demonstrates a pattern of misconduct. Please see Stipulation
attachment page 14.
<<not>> checked. (8) No
aggravating circumstances are involved.
Additional aggravating circumstances: .
C. Mitigating Circumstances [see standard 1.2(e)]. Facts supporting
mitigating circumstances are required.
<<not>> checked. (1) No Prior Discipline: Respondent has no prior record
of discipline over many years of practice coupled with present misconduct which
is not deemed serious.
<<not>>
checked. (2) No Harm: Respondent did not harm the client or person who was
the object of the misconduct.
<<not>>
checked. (3) Candor/Cooperation: Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and
cooperation with the victims of his/her misconduct and to the State Bar during
disciplinary investigation and proceedings.
<<not>>
checked. (4) Remorse: Respondent promptly took objective steps spontaneously
demonstrating remorse and recognition of the wrongdoing, which steps were designed
to timely atone for any consequences of his/her misconduct.
<<not>>
checked. (5) Restitution: Respondent paid $ on in restitution to without
the threat or force of disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings.
<<not>>
checked. (6) Delay: These disciplinary proceedings were excessively
delayed. The delay is not attributable to Respondent and the delay prejudiced
him/her.
<<not>>
checked. (7) Good Faith: Respondent acted in good faith.
<<not>>
checked. (8) Emotional/Physical Difficulties: At the time of the stipulated
act or acts of professional misconduct Respondent suffered extreme emotional
difficulties or physical disabilities which expert testimony would establish
was directly responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities
were not the product of any illegal conduct by the member, such as illegal drug
or substance abuse, and Respondent no longer suffers from such difficulties or
disabilities.
<<not>>
checked. (9) Severe Financial Stress: At the time of the misconduct, Respondent
suffered from severe financial stress which resulted from circumstances not
reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond his/her control and which were
directly responsible for the misconduct.
<<not>>
checked. (10) Family Problems: At the time of the misconduct, Respondent
suffered extreme difficulties in his/her personal life which were other than
emotional or physical in nature.
<<not>>
checked. (11) Good Character: Respondent's good character is attested to by a
wide range of references in the legal and general communities who are aware of
the full extent of his/her misconduct.
<<not>>
checked. (12) Rehabilitation: Considerable time has passed since the acts of
professional misconduct occurred followed by convincing proof of subsequent
rehabilitation.
<<not>>
checked. (13) No mitigating circumstances are involved.
Additional
mitigating circumstances:
Please
see Stipulation attachment page 15.
D. Discipline: Disbarment.
E. Additional Requirements:
(1) Rule 9.20,
California Rules of Court: Respondent must comply with the requirements of
rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in
subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 calendar days,
respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court's Order in this
matter.
<<not>> checked. (2) Restitution:
Respondent must make restitution to in the amount of $ plus 10 percent
interest per year from . If the Client Security Fund has reimbursed for all
or any portion of the principal amount, respondent must pay restitution to CSF
of the amount paid plus applicable interest and costs in accordance with
Business and Professions Code section 6140.5. Respondent must pay the above
restitution and furnish satisfactory proof of payment to the State Bar's Office
of Probation in Los Angeles no later than days from the effective date of the
Supreme Court order in this case..
checked. (3) Other: Please see
Restitution requirements in Stipulation attachment pages 17-18.
Attachment language (if any):.
ATTACHMENT TO
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION
IN THE MATTER OF: Dionne Mateos, State Bar No. 205959
STATE BAR COURT CASE NUMBER: 12-O-16056,12-O-16391,12-O-17223,
12-O-18127,12-O-18133,13-O-10114,13-O-10410,13-O-10572,
13-O-10611,13-O-10693
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that she is
culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional
Conduct.
Case No. 12-O-16056 (Complainant: Antonio Sofia)
FACTS:
1. On March 23, 2012, Antonio Sofia (Sofia) employed Respondent to
negotiate a mortgage loan modification with his lender, Bank of America.
2. Between March 23, 2012 and June 14, 2012, Soria paid Respondent $2,000
in advanced fees for loan modification services.
3. At the time Respondent charged and collected the advanced fees from
Sofia, she had not completed all of the loan modification services she had
agreed to perform.
4. On August 28, 2012, the State Bar opened an investigation regarding the
complaint submitted by Sofia.
5. On December 4, 2012, a State Bar investigator mailed Respondent a letter
that was properly addressed to Respondent at 7032 Comstock Avenue, Suite 100,
Whittier, CA 90602, Respondent’s membership address at the time, regarding
Sofia’s complaint. The letter requested a written response to specific
allegations of misconduct being investigated by the State Bar by December 17,
2012. Respondent received the letter but did not respond. At no time did
Respondent cooperate or participate in the investigation of the Sofia
complaint.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
6. By agreeing to negotiate a mortgage loan modification for Soria and
collecting $2,000 in advanced fees from Sofia when Respondent had not completed
all loan modification services she had agreed to perform, Respondent
negotiated, arranged or otherwise offered to perform a mortgage loan
modification for a fee paid by the borrower, and demanded, charged, collected
or received such fee prior to fully performing each and every service
Respondent had contracted to perform or represented that she would perform, in
willful violation of section 2944.7(a)(1 ) of the Civil Code, and thereby
wilfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3(a).
7. By failing to provide a written response to the State Bar investigator’s
letter and by failing to otherwise cooperate and participate in the State Bar’s
investigation of the Sofia complaint, Respondent failed to cooperate and
participate in a disciplinary investigation pending against Respondent in
willful violation of Business and Professions Code section 6068(i).
FACTS:
Case No. 12-O-16391 (Complainant: Jaime Rodriguez)
8. On March 13, 2012, Jaime Rodriguez (Rodfiguez) employed Respondent to
negotiate mortgage loan modifications for two properties with his lender, Bank of
America.
9. Between March 13, 2012 and April 11, 2012, Rodriguez paid Respondent a
total of $4,100 in advanced fees for loan modification services.
10. At the time Respondent charged and collected the advanced fees from
Rodriguez, she had not completed all of the loan modification services she had
agreed to perform.
11. Between April 2012 and June 2012, Respondent’s non-attorney staff
recommended that Rodriguez file for bankruptcy. Rodriguez paid an additional
$4,000 for the bankruptcy.
12. Respondent failed to adequately supervise her staff and permitted
non-attorneys to give legal advice.
13. In June 2012, Bank of America informed Rodriguez that Respondent had
not provided them with sufficient documentation to negotiate a loan
modification.
14. Respondent failed to perform legal services of value on behalf of
Rodriguez with respect to the loan modifications.
15. On June 20, 2012, Respondent caused a bankruptcy petition to be filed
on behalf of Rodriguez. However, the bankruptcy petition was defective in several
respects including the fact that Respondent failed to include the required
schedules to the bankruptcy petition. The Bankruptcy Court sent Respondent
notice that the petition had several deficiencies.
16. On July 5, 2012, Rodriguez terminated Respondent’s services and did not
want Respondent to complete the bankruptcy. He requested a full refund.
17. Respondent did not earn the $8,100 in advanced fees paid by Rodriguez.
18. Respondent received Rodriguez’s request but failed to refund any
portion of the $8,100 in advanced fees paid by Rodriguez for loan modification
services and bankruptcy services.
19. On September 12, 2012, the State Bar opened an investigation regarding
the complaint submitted by Rodriguez.
20. On December 4, 2012, a State Bar investigator mailed Respondent a
letter that was properly addressed to Respondent at 7032 Comstock Avenue, Suite
100, Whittier, CA 90602, Respondent’s membership address at the time, regarding
Rodriguez’s complaint. The letter requested a written response to specific
allegations of misconduct being investigated by the State Bar by December 17,
2012. Respondent received the letter but did not respond and did not otherwise
cooperate or participate in the investigation of the Rodriguez complaint.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
21. By agreeing to negotiate a mortgage loan modification for Rodriguez and
collecting $4,100 in advanced fees from Rodriguez when Respondent had not
completed all loan modification services she had agreed to perform, Respondent
negotiated, arranged or otherwise offered to perform a mortgage loan
modification for a fee paid by the borrower, and demanded, charged, collected
or received such fee prior to fully performing each and every service
Respondent had contracted to perform or represented that she would perform, in
willful violation of section 2944.7(a)(1) of the Civil Code, and thereby
wilfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3(a).
22. By failing to provide sufficient documentation to Bank of America on
behalf of Rodriguez for the loan modification or perform legal services of
value for the loan modification, and by failing to supervise staff and
permitting non-attorney staff to advise Rodriguez to file bankruptcy,
Respondent recklessly, intentionally or repeatedly failed to perform legal
services with competence in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct,
rule 3-110(A).
23. By failing to refund any portion of the $8,100 in unearned advanced
fees paid by Rodriguez, Respondent failed to refund promptly any part of a fee
paid in advance that has not been earned, in willful violation of Rules of
Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(2).
24. By failing to provide a written response to the State Bar
investigator’s letter and by failing to otherwise cooperate and participate in
the State Bar’s investigation of the Rodriguez complaint, Respondent failed to
cooperate and participate in a disciplinary investigation pending against
Respondent in willful violation of Business and Professions Code section
6068(i).
Case No. 12-0-17223 (Complainant: Eliseo Garcia)
FACTS:
25. On January 5, 2012, Eliseo Garcia (Garcia) employed Respondent to
negotiate a mortgage loan modification with his lender, Bank of America.
26. Between January 5, 2012 and February 18, 2012, Garcia paid Respondent a
total of $3,550 in advanced fees for loan modification services.
27. At the time Respondent charged and collected the advanced fees from
Garcia, she had not completed all of the loan modification services she had
agreed to perform.
28. By agreeing to negotiate a mortgage loan modification for Garcia and
collecting $3,550 in advanced fees from Garcia when Respondent had not
completed all loan modification services she had agreed to perform, Respondent
negotiated, arranged or otherwise offered to perform a mortgage loan
modification for a fee paid by the borrower, and demanded, charged, collected
or received such fee prior to fully performing each and every service
Respondent had contracted to perform or represented that she would perform, in
willful violation of section 2944.7(a)(1) of the Civil Code, and thereby
wilfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3(a).
Case No. 12-O-18127 (Complainant: Luis Muro)
FACTS:
29. On October 27, 2011, Luis Muro (Muro) and Griselda Diaz (Diaz) employed
Respondent to negotiate a mortgage loan modification with their lender, GMAC.
30. Between October 27, 2011 and November 10, 2011, Muro and Diaz paid
Respondent a total of $2,050 in advanced fees for loan modification services.
31. At the time Respondent charged and collected the advanced fees from
Muro and Diaz, she had not completed all of the loan modification services she
had agreed to perform.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
32. By agreeing to negotiate a mortgage loan modification for Muro and Diaz
and collecting $2,050 in advanced fees from Muro and Diaz when Respondent had
not completed all loan modification services she had agreed to perform,
Respondent negotiated, arranged or otherwise offered to perform a mortgage loan
modification for a fee paid by the borrower, and demanded, charged, collected
or received such fee prior to fully performing each and every service
Respondent had contracted to perform or represented that she would perform, in
willful violation of section 2944.7(a)(1) of the Civil Code, and thereby willfully
violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3(a).
Case No. 12-O- 18133 (Complainant: Filemon Recendez)
FACTS:
33. On June 9, 2012, Filemon Recendez (Recendez) employed Respondent to
negotiate a mortgage loan modification with his lender, Bank of America.
34. Between June 9, 2012 and July 2012, Recendez paid Respondent a total of
$3,000 in advanced fees for loan modification services.
35. At the time Respondent charged and collected the advanced fees from
Recendez, she had not completed all of the loan modification services she had
agreed to perform.
36. By agreeing to negotiate a mortgage loan modification for Recendez and
collecting $3,000 in advanced fees from Recendez when Respondent had not
completed all loan modification services she had agreed to perform, Respondent
negotiated, arranged or otherwise offered to perform a mortgage loan
modification for a fee paid by the borrower, and demanded, charged, collected
or received such fee prior to fully performing each and every service Respondent
had contracted to perform or represented that she would perform, in willful
violation of section 2944.7(a)(1) of the Civil Code, and thereby wilfully
violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3(a).
Case No. 13-O-10114 (Complainant: Donald Brady)
FACTS:
37. In November 2011, Donald Brady (Brady) employed Respondent to negotiate
a mortgage loan modification with his lender, Wells Fargo.
38. In February 2012, Respondent’s non-attorney office manager, Antonio
Flores Trejo (Trejo), advised Brady that Respondent had submitted a loan
modification packet to Wells Fargo. Wells Fargo denied Brady’s loan
modification. Thereafter, Trejo advised Brady that he must file a Chapter 13
bankruptcy petition in order to save his home from foreclosure.
39. Respondent failed to adequately supervise her staff and permitted
non-attorneys to give legal advice.
40. On June 15, 2012, Brady paid Respondent $1,300 in advanced fees to file
a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition.
41. On June 18, 2012, Respondent filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on
behalf of Brady, but listed Brady as filing in "pro per." The
bankruptcy petition was defective in several respects. In July 2012, the
Bankruptcy Court dismissed Brady’s Chapter 13 petition for failure to file
necessary documentation.
42. In July 2012, Brady terminated Respondent’s services and requested a
full refund of the $1,300 in advanced fees paid for bankruptcy services. On
July 19, 2012, Respondent issued a check to Brady in the amount of $1,300 as a
refund of advanced fees paid to Respondent.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
43. By failing to supervise Trejo and permitting Trejo to advise Brady to
file a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition and failing to file necessary
documentation in support of Brady’s Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, Respondent
intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly failed to perform legal services with
competence, in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule
3-110(A).
44. By allowing the Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition listing Brady as a
"pro per" debtor who was not represented by counsel to be filed with
the court, misrepresenting that Brady was not represented by counsel,
Respondent committed an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or
corruption, in willful violation of Business and Professions Code section 6106.
Case No. 13-O- 10410 (Complainant: Ezequiel Gomez)
FACTS:
45. On October 7, 2011, Ezequiel Gomez (Gomez) employed Respondent to
negotiate a loan modification with his lender, Wells Fargo.
46. Between October 7, 2011 and November 6, 2011, Gomez paid Respondent a
total of $2,050 in advanced fees for loan modification services.
47. At the time Respondent charged and collected the advanced fees from
Gomez, she had not completed all of the loan modification services she had
agreed to perform.
48. At no time did Respondent perform the loan modification services that
she agreed to perform. She did not earn any portion of the $2,050 in advanced
fees paid by Gomez.
49. In late 2012, Gomez requested a full refund of the $2,050 in advanced
fees paid for loan modification services.
50. Respondent received Gomez’s request and refunded a total of $950 to
Gomez, but she has failed to refund the balance of $1,100 in advanced fees paid
by Gomez.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
51. By failing to negotiate a mortgage loan modification for Gomez and by
performing no services of value, Respondent intentionally, recklessly, or
repeatedly failed to perform any services with competence in willful violation
of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A).
52. By agreeing to negotiate a mortgage loan modification for Gomez and
collecting $2,050 in advanced fees from Gomez when Respondent had not completed
all loan modification services she had agreed to perform, Respondent
negotiated, arranged or otherwise offered to perform a mortgage loan modification
for a fee paid by the borrower, and demanded, charged, collected or received
such fee prior to fully performing each and every service Respondent had
contracted to perform or represented that she would perform, in willful
violation of section 2944.7(a)(1) of the Civil Code, and thereby wilfully
violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3(a).
53. By failing to refund the balance of $1,100 in unearned advanced fees
paid by Gomez, Respondent failed to refund promptly any part of a fee paid in
advance that has not been earned, in willful violation of Rules of Professional
Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(2).
Case No. 13-O-10572 (Complainant: Maria Quintanilla)
FACTS:
54. On February 25, 2012, Maria Quintanilla (Quintanilla) employed
Respondent to negotiate a mortgage loan modification with her lender, Bank of
America.
55. Between February 25, 2012 and May 1, 2012, Quintanilla paid Respondent
a total of $2,050 in advanced fees for loan modification services.
56. At the time Respondent charged and collected the advanced fees from
Quintanilla, she had not completed all of the loan modification services she
had agreed to perform.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
57. By agreeing to negotiate a mortgage loan modification for Quintanilla
and collecting $2,050 in advanced fees from Quintanilla when Respondent had not
completed all loan modification services she had agreed to perform, Respondent
negotiated, arranged or otherwise offered to perform a mortgage loan
modification for a fee paid by the borrower, and demanded, charged, collected
or received such fee prior to fully performing each and every service
Respondent had contracted to perform or represented that she would perform, in
willful violation of section 2944.7(a)(1) of the Civil Code, and thereby
wilfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3 (a).
Case No. 13-0-10611 (Complainant: Alejandro Sanchez)
FACTS:
58. On June 26, 2012, Alejandro Sanchez (Sanchez) employed Respondent to
negotiate a mortgage loan modification with his lender, Bank of America.
59. Between June 26, 2012 and June 29, 2012, Sanchez paid Respondent a
total of $2,050 in advanced fees for loan modification services.
60. At the time Respondent charged and collected the advanced fees from
Sanchez, she had not completed all of the loan modification services she had
agreed to perform.
61. In August 2012, Bank of America informed Sanchez that his house was in
foreclosure proceedings, and that Respondent had not attempted to negotiate a
loan modification for him. At no time did Respondent perform the loan
modification services that she agreed to perform. She did not earn any portion
of the $2,050 in advanced fees paid by Sanchez.
62. Thereafter, Sanchez requested a full refund of the $2,050 in advanced
fees paid for loan modification services.
63. Respondent received Sanchez’s request but failed to refund any portion
of the $2,050 in advanced fees paid by Sanchez.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
64. By failing to negotiate a mortgage loan modification for Sanchez and by
performing no services of value, Respondent intentionally, recklessly, or
repeatedly failed to perform any services with competence in willful violation
of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A).
65. By agreeing to negotiate a mortgage loan modification for Sanchez and
collecting $2,050 in advanced fees from Sanchez when Respondent had not
completed all loan modification services she had agreed to perform, Respondent
negotiated, arranged or otherwise offered to perform a mortgage loan
modification for a fee paid by the borrower, and demanded, charged, collected
or received such fee prior to fully performing each and every service
Respondent had contracted to perform or represented that she would perform, in
willful violation of section 2944.7(a)(1 ) of the Civil Code, and thereby wilfully
violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3(a).
66. By failing to refund any portion of the $2,050 in unearned advanced
fees paid by Sanchez, Respondent failed to refund promptly any part of a fee
paid in advance that has not been earned, in willful violation of Rules of
Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(2).
Case No. 13-O- 10693 (Complainant: Jose Carapia)
FACTS:
67. On December 11, 2012, Jose Carapia (Carapia) employed Respondent to
file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition to save Carapia’s home from foreclosure.
68. Between December 11, 2012 and December 15, 2012, Carapia paid
Respondent a total of $1,300 for Chapter 7 bankruptcy services.
69. Thereafter, Respondent’s non-attorney employee, David, told Carapia he
must pay an additional $2,300 in advanced fees before Respondent would file his
Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Carapia declined to pay additional legal fees,
and Respondent proceeded to file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on behalf of
Carapia. However, the bankruptcy petition was defective in several respects.
The Bankruptcy Court subsequently dismissed Carapia’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy
petition for failure to file necessary documentation. Respondent received
notice of the deficiencies in the bankruptcy petition and notice of the dismissal
of the bankruptcy petition, but Respondent failed to correct the deficiencies
or seek to set aside the dismissal.
70. Wells Fargo informed Carapia that they could not discuss a loan
modification with him because Respondent informed them that she represented
Carapia in the bankruptcy matter.
71. Wells Fargo left multiple messages for Respondent regarding a potential
loan modification for Carapia. Respondent received the messages but failed to
contact Wells Fargo on behalf of Carapia.
72. Carapia asked Respondent to execute a consent form permitting Wells
Fargo to negotiate directly with Carapia regarding a loan modification.
Respondent failed to sign the consent form. Respondent’s employee, David, told
Carapia to stop contacting Respondent’s office regarding the consent form, as
Carapia had not paid the $2,300 in additional advanced fees.
73. Respondent did not perform any legal services of value on behalf of
Carapia and did not earn any portion of the $1,300 in advanced fees paid in
Carapia.
74. Respondent did not refund any portion of the $1,300 in earned advanced
fees that Carapia paid for bankruptcy service CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
75. By failing to supervise her employee, David, in his interactions with
Carapia, failing to
provide necessary documentation to the court in Carapia’s Chapter 7
bankruptcy action, failing to complete the Chapter 7 bankruptcy action, failing
to respond to Wells Fargo’s messages regarding a potential loan modification
for Carapia, failing to sign a consent form permitting Wells Fargo to negotiate
directly with Carapia regarding a loan modification, and by failing to perform
any legal service of value on behalf of Carapia, Respondent intentionally,
recklessly, or repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence in
willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A).
76. By failing to refund any portion of the $1,300 in unearned advanced
fees paid by Sanchez, Respondent failed to refund promptly any part of a fee
paid in advance that has not been earned, in willful violation of Rules of
Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(2).
AGGRAVATION AND MITIGATION
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Prior Record of Discipline: Respondent has two prior records of discipline
(Standard 1.2(b)(i)):
First Prior Record of Discipline: Effective July 28, 2011, in State Bar
case numbers 09-0-101348 et. al., Respondent stipulated to violating Rules of
Professional Conduct, rules 3-110(A) (failure to perform competently),
4-100(B)(3) (failure to account), 3-700(D)(1) (failure to release a file), and
3-700(D)(2) (failure to refund unearned fees), as well as Business and
Professions Code sections 6068(m) (failure to respond to client inquiries),
6068(i) (failure to cooperate in State Bar investigation), and 6103 (failure to
obey court orders). The misconduct in these matters involved six separate
client matters and occurred between July 2008 and November 2010. The majority
of these cases involved Respondent representing clients related to loan
modification and bankruptcy services. Respondent stipulated to one year of
stayed suspension and one year of probation.
Second Prior Record of Discipline: Effective January 18, 2013, in State Bar
case numbers
11-O-13347 et al., Respondent stipulated to violating Rules of Professional
Conduct, rules 3-110(A) (failure to perform competently), 3-700(D)(2) (failure
to refund unearned fees), 4-100(B)(3) (failure to account), 3-700(A) (improper
withdrawal) and Business and Professions Code sections 6068(i) (failure to
cooperate and participate in State Bar investigation), 6068(m) (failure to
respond to client inquiries), and 6106.3 (collecting advanced fees for loan
modification). The misconduct in these matters occurred between March 2009 and
July 2012, involved four client matters, and the majority of the cases involved
loan modification. Respondent stipulated to two (2) years of actual suspension
and three (3) years of probation.
Harm: The current misconduct caused significant harm to ten clients. In
each of these cases, Respondent’s clients were financially distressed and
sought Respondent’s assistance at critical junctures in their lives. These
clients have been without the return of their fees for as long as a year and a
half. Respondent’s failure to refund the advanced fees has deprived them of
their money. (Standard 1.2(b)(iv).)
Multiple Acts of Misconduct/Pattern of Misconduct: Respondent’s conduct
involved multiple acts of wrongdoing as there are twenty acts of misconduct in
ten client matters and coupled with the misconduct in the prior records of
discipline demonstrates a pattern of willfully failing to perform services and
a habitual disregard for her clients, demonstrating an abandonment of the
causes in which she was retained. In Arm v. State Bar (1990) 50 Cal.3d 763,780,
the Court found that a pattern of misconduct can be established by including
similar misconduct from the prior record of discipline. (Standard 1.2(b)(ii).)
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Pre-Trial Stipulation: Respondent is entitled to mitigation for entering
into a full stipulation with the Office of Chief Trial Counsel prior to the
trial, thereby saving State Bar Court time and resources. (ln re Downey (2009)
5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 151,156; In the Matter of Fan Sickle (Rev. Dept.
2006) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 980, 993-994.) However, the facts in the
matters could have been easily proven. Also, the mitigation is tempered by
Respondent’s failure to cooperate and participate in the State Bar
investigation. Thus, Respondent’s cooperation is entitled to some, but not
great, weight in mitigation.
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.
The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct provide a
"process of fixing discipline" pursuant to a set of written
principles to "better discharge the purposes of attorney discipline as
announced by the Supreme Court." (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds.
for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, Introduction (all further references
to standards are to this source).) The primary purposes of disciplinary
proceedings and of the sanctions imposed are "the protection of the
public, the courts and the legal profession; the maintenance of high
professional standards by attorneys and the preservation of public confidence
in the legal profession." (ln re Morse (1995) 11 Cal.4th 184, 205; std
1.3.)
The standards are entitled to "great weight" and should be
followed "whenever possible" in determining level of discipline. (ln
re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 92, quoting In re Brown (1995) 12 Cal.4th
205,220 and In re Young (1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 267, fn. 11 .) Adherence to the
standards in the great majority of cases serves the valuable purpose of
eliminating disparity and assuring consistency, that is, the imposition of
similar attorney discipline for instances of similar attorney misconduct. (In
re Naney (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 190.) Any discipline recommendation different
from that set forth in the applicable standards should clearly explain the
reasons for the deviation. (Blair v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 762, 776, fn.
5.)
Standard 1.7(b) provides that if a member is found culpable of professional
misconduct in any proceeding in which discipline may be imposed and the member
has a record of two prior impositions of discipline the degree of discipline in
the current proceeding shall be disbarment unless the most compelling
mitigating circumstances clearly predominate.
Respondent has two prior records of discipline and there are no compelling
mitigating circumstances that clearly predominate. However, the current
misconduct occurred between October 2011 and December 2012, which is, in part,
during the same timeframe as the prior misconduct which occurred from March
2009 to July 2012. Therefore, it is appropriate to consider In the Matter of
Sklar.
In In the Matter of Sklar (Review Dept. 1993) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr.
602, the respondent was found culpable of six counts of misconduct in seven
client matters, including the misappropriation of $13,807.34 in trust funds,
failure to perform competently, failure to communicate with clients and failure
to advise clients of potential conflicts of interest, and failure to comply
with the terms of a previously imposed disciplinary probation. The Heating
Department recommended that respondent be actually suspended for two years.
Both the respondent and the State Bar appealed. One of the issues on appeal was
whether the Hearing Department appropriately declined to consider respondent’s
prior disciplinary matter, where respondent was actually suspended for 80 days,
as aggravating, because the misconduct in the prior matter and the cases at
issue, aside from the probation violation, occurred during the same time
period. (ln the Matter of Sklar, 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. at 618.)
The Review Department held that the impact of the prior disciplinary matter
was diminished because it occurred during the same time as the misconduct in
the case at issue. (In the Matter of Sklar, 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. at 618.)
Accordingly, the Review Department considered the "totality of the
findings in the two cases to determine what the discipline would have been had
all the charged misconduct in this period been brought as one case." (Id.)
The reasoning in Sklar is applicable in the instant case because Respondent’s
misconduct in her two prior records of discipline overlapped in time and the
misconduct in the ten instant matters began during the same timeframe as the
misconduct in the last prior record of discipline. The misconduct in
Respondent’s first prior record of discipline occurred from July 2008 to
November 2010, which overlapped with the misconduct in the last prior record of
discipline. Respondent’s last prior misconduct occurred from March 2009 to July
2012 and involved four client matters. The misconduct in the instant case
occurred during roughly that same timeframe, beginning in October 2011 but
continued through December 2012. Therefore, it is appropriate to consider the
totality of the misconduct in all twenty cases (the prior cases plus the
current case) to determine what the discipline would be had all the charged
misconduct been considered together.
If all charged misconduct had been considered together, twenty cases, the
discipline would have increased to disbarment. The majority of the misconduct
in the priors and the current matter involved the same type of cases: mortgage
loan modification matters or services related to clients who were in financial
distress and in fear of losing their homes. Furthermore, as in the priors and
in the instant case, Respondent has engaged in multiple instances of wrongdoing
which has caused significant harm to her vulnerable clients and Respondent has
failed to make complete restitution. Moreover, taking all twenty cases
together, Respondent’s misconduct evidences a pattern that has spanned over
four years and continued through December 2012, which is one month prior to the
effective date of her last record of discipline. (See Twohy v. State Bar (1989)
48 Cal.3d 502,512, habitual disregard by an attorney for the interests of his
clients combined with failure to communicate justifies disbarment). Standard
2.4 requires disbarment for a pattern of willfully failing to perform services
demonstrating the member’s abandonment of the causes in which he was retained.
Therefore, had the present matters been brought at the same time as the prior
matters, the proper level of discipline would have been disbarment. Disbarment
is consistent with the purposes of attorney discipline as set forth in Standard
1.3: protecting the public, the courts, and the legal profession, maintaining
high professional standards by attorneys, and preserving public confidence in
the legal profession.
PENDING PROCEEDINGS.
The disclosure date referred to, on page 2, paragraph A(7), was April 25,
2013.
COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.
Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has
informed respondent that as of April 25, 2013, the prosecution costs in this
matter are $11,091. Respondent further acknowledges that this is an estimate
and should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation
be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further
proceedings.
RESTITUTION.
Respondent must make restitution to Antonio Soria in the amount of $2,000
plus 10 percent interest per year from June 14, 2012. If the Client Security
Fund ("CSF") has reimbursed Antonio Soria for all or any portion of
the principal amount, Respondent must also pay restitution to CSF in the amount
paid plus applicable interests and costs in accordance with Business and
Professional Code Section 6140.5.
Respondent must make restitution to Jaime Rodriguez in the amount of $4,100
plus 10 percent interest per year from March 13, 2012 and $4000 plus 10 percent
interest per year from June 30, 2012. If the Client Security Fund
("CSF") has reimbursed Jaime Rodriquez for all or any portion of the
principal amount, Respondent must also pay restitution to CSF in the amount
paid plus applicable interests and costs in accordance with Business and
Professional Code Section 6140.5.
Respondent must make restitution to Eliseo Garcia in the amount of $3,550
plus 10 percent interest per year from February 18, 2012. If the Client
Security Fund ("CSF") has reimbursed Eliseo Garcia for all or any
portion of the principal amount, Respondent must also pay restitution to CSF in
the amount paid plus applicable interests and costs in accordance with Business
and Professional Code Section 6140.5.
Respondent must make restitution to Luis Mura and Griselda Diaz in the
amount of $2,050 plus 10 percent interest per year from November 10, 2011. If
the Client Security Fund ("CSF") has reimbursed Luis Mura and
Griselda Diaz for all or any portion of the principal amount, Respondent must
also pay restitution to CSF in the amount paid plus applicable interests and
costs in accordance with Business and Professional Code Section 6140.5.
Respondent must make restitution to Filemon Recendez in the amount of
$3,000 plus 10 percent interest per year from July 31, 2012. If the Client
Security Fund ("CSF") has reimbursed Filemon Recendez for all or any
portion of the principal amount, Respondent must also pay restitution to CSF in
the amount paid plus applicable interests and costs in accordance with Business
and Professional Code Section 6140.5.
Respondent must make restitution to Ezequiel Gomez in the amount of $1,100
plus 10 percent interest
per year from November 6, 2011. If the Client Security Fund
("CSF") has reimbursed Ezequiel Gomez for all or any portion of the
principal amount, Respondent must also pay restitution to CSF in the amount
paid plus applicable interests and costs in accordance with Business and
Professional Code Section 6140.5.
Respondent must make restitution to Maria Quintanilla in the amount of
$2,050 plus 10 percent interest per year from May 1, 2012. If the Client
Security Fund ("CSF") has reimbursed Maria Quintanilla for all or any
portion of the principal amount, Respondent must also pay restitution to CSF in
the amount paid plus applicable interests and costs in accordance with Business
and Professional Code Section 6140.5.
Respondent must make restitution to Alejandro Sanchez in the amount of
$2,050 plus 10 percent interest per year from June 29, 2012. If the Client
Security Fund ("CSF,) has reimbursed Alejandro Sanchez for all or any
portion of the principal amount, Respondent must also pay restitution to CSF in
the amount paid plus applicable interests and costs in accordance with Business
and Professional Code Section 6140.5.
Respondent must make restitution to Jose Carapia in the amount of $1,300
plus 10 percent interest per year from December 15, 2012. If the Client
Security Fund ("CSF") has reimbursed Jose Carapia for all or any
portion of the principal amount, Respondent must also pay restitution to CSF in
the amount paid plus applicable interests and costs in accordance with Business
and Professional Code Section 6140.5.
SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES
Case Number(s): 12-O-16056,12-O-16391,12-O-17223,12-O-18127,
12-O-18133,13-O-10114,13-O-10410,13-O-10572,13-O-10611,
13-O-10693
In the Matter of: Dionne Mateos
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable,
signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and
conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: Dionne Mateos
Date: 4/25/13
Respondent’s Counsel:
Date:
Deputy Trial Counsel: Mia R. Ellis
Date: 4/25/13
DISBARMENT ORDER
Case Number(s):
In the Matter of:
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately
protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of
counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are
APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED
AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the
Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to
withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this
order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved
stipulation. (See rule 5.58 (E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective
date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order
herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California
Rules of Court.)
Respondent is ordered transferred to involuntary inactive status pursuant
to Business and Professions Code section 6007, subdivision (c)(4). Respondent’s
inactive enrollment will be effective three (3) calendar days after this order
is served by mail and will terminate upon the effective date of the Supreme
Court’s order imposing discipline herin, or as provided for by rule 5.111(D)(2)
or the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California, or as otherwise
ordered by the Supreme Court pursuant to its plenary jurisdiction.
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court:
Date:
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over
the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to
standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on May 13,
2013, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND
ORDER APPROVING ; ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE ENROLLMENT
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through
the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as
follows:
DIONNE MATEOS
LAW OFFICES OF DIONNE MATEOS
7032 COMSTOCK AVE STE. 100
WHITTIER, CA 90602
<not>> checked. by certified mail, No. , with return receipt
requested, through the United States Postal Service at , California, addressed
as follows:
<<not>> checked. by overnight mail at , California, addressed
as follows:
<<not>> checked. by fax transmission, at fax number . No error
was reported by the fax machine that I used.
<<not>> checked. By personal service by leaving the documents
in a sealed envelope or package clearly labeled to identify the attorney being
served with a receptionist or a person having charge of the attorney’s office,
addressed as follows:
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the
State Bar of California addressed as follows:
Mia R. Ellis, Enforcement, Los Angeles
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los
Angeles, California, on May 13, 2013.
Signed by:
Johnnie Lee Smith
Case Administrator
State Bar Court