

State Bar Court of California				
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	Hearing Department			
Los Angeles DISBARMENT				
Hugh G. Radigan				
Deputy Trial Counsel		DIT TO		
845 South Figueroa Street		FILED		
Los Angeles, California 90017-2515				
213-765-1206		APR 07 2015		
Bar # 94251		STATE BAR COURT		
		ULEKK'S OFRICE		
Counsel For Respondent	1	LOS ANGELES		
Kenneth C. Kocourek				
5785 Brockton Avenue	DITRLI	CMATTER		
Riverside, California 92506 951-323-8208	IUDLI			
551-525-0200				
	Submitted to: Assigned Judge			
Bar # 59609				
In the Matter of:	DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING; ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE ENROLLMENT			
KEITH HAMMOND BRAY				
	DISBARMENT			
Bar # 219586				
Dal # 213300	🔲 PREVIOUS STIPULATIO	N REJECTED		
A Member of the State Bar of California				
(Respondent)				

Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.

A. Parties' Acknowledgments:

- (1) Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted **June 1, 2002**.
- (2) The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
- (3) All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of (12) pages, not including the order.
- (4) A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
- (5) Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law."

- (6) The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
- (7) No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
- (8) Payment of Disciplinary Costs—Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
 - Costs to be awarded to the State Bar.
 - Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
 - Costs are entirely waived.
- (9) ORDER OF INACTIVE ENROLLMENT: The parties are aware that if this stipulation is approved, the judge will issue an order of inactive enrollment under Business and Professions Code section 6007, subdivision (c)(4), and Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, rule 5.111(D)(1).

B. Aggravating Circumstances [Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct, standards 1.2(f) & 1.5]. Facts supporting aggravating circumstances are required.

- (1) \square Prior record of discipline
 - (a) \boxtimes State Bar Court case # of prior case 06-0-11728 and 06-0-13919
 - (b) Date prior discipline effective July 25, 2010
 - (c) Rules of Professional Conduct/ State Bar Act violations: Rule 3-110(A), (two violations), rule 3-700(A)(2), two violations of Business and Professions Code section 6068(m) and one violation of section 6068(d).
 - (d) Degree of prior discipline Thirty (30) days actual suspension, one (1) year stayed suspension and two (2) years probation.
 - (e) If respondent has two or more incidents of prior discipline, use space provided below:

State Bar Court case #s 08-O-13061, 08-O-14778 and 09-O-13237; One hundred fifty (150) days actual suspension, two (2) years stayed suspension and two (2) years probation, effective December 22, 2010; Respondent admitted culpability for three violations of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(2), one violation of rules 4-100(A), and 3-700(A)(2), and one violation of Business and Professions Code sections 6106 and 6103.

- (2) Dishonesty: Respondent's misconduct was intentional, surrounded by, or followed by bad faith, dishonesty, concealment, overreaching or other violations of the State Bar Act or Rules of Professional Conduct.
- (3) Trust Violation: Trust funds or property were involved and respondent refused or was unable to account to the client or person who was the object of the misconduct for improper conduct toward said funds or property.
- (4) Harm: Respondent's misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public or the administration of justice. See page 9 of the attachment.

- (5) Indifference: Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for the consequences of his or her misconduct.
- (6) Lack of Cooperation: Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims of his/her misconduct or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation or proceedings.
- (7) Multiple/Pattern of Misconduct: Respondent's current misconduct evidences multiple acts of wrongdoing or demonstrates a pattern of misconduct. See page 9 of the attachment.
- (8) Restitution: Respondent failed to make restitution.
- (9) **No aggravating circumstances** are involved.

Additional aggravating circumstances:

C. Mitigating Circumstances [see standards 1.2(g) & 1.6]. Facts supporting mitigating circumstances are required.

- (1) **No Prior Discipline:** Respondent has no prior record of discipline over many years of practice coupled with present misconduct which is not deemed serious.
- (2) **No Harm:** Respondent did not harm the client, the public, or the administration of justice.
- (3) Candor/Cooperation: Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and cooperation with the victims of his/her misconduct and to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation and proceedings.
- (4) Remorse: Respondent promptly took objective steps spontaneously demonstrating remorse and recognition of the wrongdoing, which steps were designed to timely atone for any consequences of his/her misconduct.
- (5) Restitution: Respondent paid \$ on in restitution to without the threat or force of disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings.
- (6) Delay: These disciplinary proceedings were excessively delayed. The delay is not attributable to respondent and the delay prejudiced him/her.
- (7) **Good Faith:** Respondent acted with a good faith belief that was honestly held and reasonable.
- (8) Emotional/Physical Difficulties: At the time of the stipulated act or acts of professional misconduct respondent suffered extreme emotional difficulties or physical or mental disabilities which expert testimony would establish was directly responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities were not the product of any illegal conduct by the member, such as illegal drug or substance abuse, and the difficulties or disabilities no longer pose a risk that Respondent will commit misconduct.
- (9) Severe Financial Stress: At the time of the misconduct, respondent suffered from severe financial stress which resulted from circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond his/her control and which were directly responsible for the misconduct.
- (10) **Family Problems:** At the time of the misconduct, respondent suffered extreme difficulties in his/her personal life which were other than emotional or physical in nature.

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- (11) Good Character: Respondent's extraordinarily good character is attested to by a wide range of references in the legal and general communities who are aware of the full extent of his/her misconduct.
- (12) Rehabilitation: Considerable time has passed since the acts of professional misconduct occurred followed by subsequent rehabilitation.
- (13) **No mitigating circumstances** are involved.

Additional mitigating circumstances:

See page 10 of the attachment.

D. Discipline: Disbarment.

E. Additional Requirements:

- (1) **Rule 9.20, California Rules of Court**: Respondent must comply with the requirements of rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 calendar days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court's Order in this matter.
- (2) Restitution: Respondent must make restitution to in the amount of \$ plus 10 percent interest per year from If the Client Security Fund has reimbursed for all or any portion of the principal amount, respondent must pay restitution to CSF of the amount paid plus applicable interest and costs in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6140.5. Respondent must pay the above restitution and furnish satisfactory proof of payment to the State Bar's Office of Probation in Los Angeles no later than days from the effective date of the Supreme Court order in this case.
- (3) Other: Restitution: Respondent must make restitution to Calvin and Lucille Hull in the amount of \$7,200 plus 10 per cent interest per year from November 24, 2012. If the Client Security Fund has reimbursed Calvin and Lucille Hull for all or any portion of the principal amount, respondent must pay restitution to CSF of the amount paid plus applicable interest and costs in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6140.5.

ATTACHMENT TO

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION

IN THE MATTER OF: KEITH HAMMOND BRAY

CASE NUMBER: 13-O-12487-YDR

FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that he is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct.

Case No. 13-O-12487 (Complainant: Calvin and Lucille Hull)

FACTS:

1. On November 24, 2012, Calvin and Lucille Hull ("Hulls) retained Respondent and his law firm, Haven Legal Group, for the purpose of keeping their property from foreclosure. Having a background in real estate, the Hulls had earlier exhausted their efforts on their own to secure loan modifications on the property and had filed successive bankruptcy petitions. Respondent was aware of their earlier efforts.

2. Respondent was to advise the Hulls of the best possible means to save their home and to initiate and carry through with legal proceedings if necessary. Respondent and the Hulls agreed that a direct action against the property lender, Central Mortgage, and others, setting forth causes of action sounding in wrongful foreclosure/lender violations, was the best course.

3. The Hulls paid Respondent a total of \$7,200 in advanced fees between November 24, 2012 and February 28, 2013.

4. In spite of the express request of the Hulls that a loan modification not be pursued since they had personally earlier explored and exhausted that option, Respondent nevertheless prepared and submitted a loan modification package to the Hull's lender on December 13, 2012.

5. Confronted with an imminent auction date on the Hull's property of March 19, 2013, Respondent attempted to file a lawsuit on March 14, 2013, styled *Hull v. Central Mortgage* USDC, Central District of California (Southern Division-Santa Ana) Case No. 8:13-cv-00433-UA-DUTY, directed against the property lender and others.

6. The summons and complaint was never accepted for filing due to the fact that concurrent with submitting the complaint, Respondent filed with the court applications on behalf of both clients to proceed without prepaying fees and costs, based upon their financial condition.

7. The two applications forma pauperus were rejected by the court upon presentation due to the inadequacy of the papers. The complaint only received a lodged stamp on March 14, 2013, as opposed to a filed stamp due to the rejection of the applications.

8. Neither of the Hulls was aware of the application filings and neither signed off on their respective applications prior to their attempted filing with the court. Their signatures appearing on the applications were simulations, placed thereon by, or with the approval of Respondent.

9. An order denying the applications was signed March 15, 2013. The docket sheet reflected that on the basis of this order, the case was designated JS-6, terminated. By virtue of this designation, the case was deemed closed, the action ceased to exist as a viable action and no substantive review or consideration would be given to the merits of the complaint.

10. E-mail notification was sent by the court to Respondent of the termination of the action on March 18, 2013. Respondent received this notice.

11. Prior to receiving notice of the termination, Respondent prepared and filed on March 18, 2013, an ex parte application seeking injunctive relief to stall out the pending auction date.

12. Respondent's declaration appended to the ex parte application recited that he gave notice to Central Mortgage Company, Old Republic Default Management Services Company and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., advising them of the ex parte application and hearing date of March 18, 2013 at 8:30 a.m.

13. The proof of service of the summons and complaint reflected that on the morning of March 18, 2013, all three defendants were personally served with the summons, complaint and related ex parte application. In reality, none of the three defendants were served with the summons and complaint or the ex parte application.

14. Contrary to the March 18, 2013, Respondent recited within a voluntary dismissal of the complaint filed March 26, 2013, that "no defendant was served with the complaint and no defendant has answered or otherwise responded to Plaintiff's complaint." Respondent failed to advise the Hulls of the filing of the dismissal and did not have their consent to so proceed.

15. On March 19, 2013, the Hull's property was purchased at the foreclosure sale.

16. By virtue of the JS-6 designation, nothing was substantively considered by the court or ruled upon, the complaint ceased to exist as a viable action upon denial of the applications for fee waiver as of March 15, 2013. No substantive review of the complaint or ex parte application was conducted by the court.

17. On March 19, 2013, Respondent misrepresented the status of the case when he told the Hulls: "The judge denied my motion after all of that work, no reason offered and no email sent to me as this is done on-line. I spent Friday to Monday setting this up and I am absolutely perplexed....Now I have a complaint out there, but the judge did not see the merits as the judge did review both the complaint and the motion. I think the judge is wrong, but I do not want to waste time and money where it should not be wasted."

18. Respondent's March 19, 2013 invoice entry reflects "Called clients to advise them we lost the motion. I do not know the reason why. I believe the complaint was thin, but the duty judge did not make matters easier."

19. The Hulls terminated Respondent effective April 5, 2013, and demanded an accounting and full refund together with the return of their file materials. When Respondent provided their file it was incomplete. Respondent did not provide an accounting.

20. A detailed statement of charges/attorney activity was provided to the State Bar by Respondent dated July 9, 2013, during the course of the investigation. The statement was inaccurate in material respects, and deliberately created to mislead the investigator. It had not been provided to the Hulls during the course of his representation even though Respondent told the State Bar that he had.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

21. By negotiating, arranging or attempting to perform a home loan modification or mortgage loan forbearance for a fee paid by a borrower, and demanding, charging, collecting and receiving fees from the Hulls prior to fully performing each and every service he contracted to perform or represented he would perform, in violation of Civil Code section 2944.7(a)(1), Respondent wilfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3.

22. By failing to properly serve and file the summons and complaint and ex parte application in the action styled *Hull v. Central Mortgage* USDC, Central District of California (Southern Division-Santa Ana) Case No. 8:13-cv-00433-UA-DUTY, by failing to secure a hearing date for the ex parte application and by filing with the court defective in forma pauperus applications on behalf of the Hulls, Respondent intentionally recklessly, or repeatedly failed to perform with competence, in willful violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A).

23. By failing to provide the Hulls an accounting of the advance fees paid by the Hulls after it was requested on April 5, 2013, Respondent failed to render appropriate accounts to a client regarding all funds coming into Respondent's possession in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(B)(3).

24. By misrepresenting to his clients, Calvin and Lucille Hull, on March 19, 2013, that he had properly filed the complaint and ex parte application seeking injunctive relief, and that the Court had reviewed the merits of the pleadings and requested relief and denied the requested injunction in United States District Court, Central District of California, (Southern Division-Santa Ana), Case No. 8:13-cv-00433-UA-DUTY, styled *Hull v. Central Mortgage*, when Respondent knew the statements were false, Respondent committed an act involving dishonesty in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.

25. By creating and/or causing to be created, and filing applications to proceed in District Court without prepaying fees or costs on behalf of the Hulls, by signing or causing to be signed the Hulls signature on the applications, when neither application had been reviewed or signed by the client, by misrepresenting to the Court, that the applications were authorized and accurate documents when Respondent knew that the submitted applications had not been approved, reviewed or signed by the client and contained false information, Respondent committed acts involving dishonesty in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.

26. By executing a declaration March 18, 2013, re ex parte notice, which Respondent signed under penalty of perjury, which contained false information concerning the sufficiency of notice of the ex parte application, which Respondent submitted to the court, Respondent misrepresented to the Court, that the ex parte notice was properly noted when Respondent knew the submitted declaration contained

false information, and thereby committed an act involving dishonesty in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.

27. By creating and/or causing to be created a time sheet subsequent to his termination which inaccurately reflected services performed by Respondent and members of his office on behalf of the Hulls, by representing to the State Bar during the investigation of this matter that the time sheet had been provided to the Hulls together with their file materials when the file was returned to the Hulls on or about April 22, 2013, when no time sheet was included within the file materials returned to the Hulls, Respondent misrepresented to the State Bar that the time sheet was accurate and contained within the returned file materials and thereby committed an act involving dishonesty in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

Prior Record of Discipline (Std. 1.5(a)): Respondent has two prior records of discipline.

In State Bar Court Case Nos. 06-O-11728 and 06-O-13919, the Court imposed an actual suspension of 30 days, stayed suspension of one year and two years probationary period, effective July 25, 2010. Respondent admitted culpability for two violations of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A) (failure to perform), and rule 3-700(A)(2) (improper withdrawal), and two violations of Business and Professions Code section 6068(m) (failure to respond to reasonable inquiries) and one violation of section 6068(d) (misleading the court). Respondent submitted to the court a declaration wherein he simulated the client's signature.

In State Bar Court Case Nos. 08-O-13061, 08-O-14778 and 09-O-13237, the Court imposed an actual suspension of 150 days, stayed suspension of two years and two years probationary period, effective December 22, 2010. Respondent admitted culpability for three violations of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-700 (D)(2) (failure to refund unearned fee), rule 4-100(A) (failure to maintain client funds in CTA) and rule 3-700(A)(2) (improper withdrawal), and one violation of Business and Professions Code section 6106 (moral turpitude/misappropriation) and one violation of section 6103 (violation of court order). Generally, prior misconduct is considered aggravating to current misconduct. (*In the Matter of Downey* (Review Dept. 2009) 5 Cal State Bar Ct. Rptr. 151.)

Harm (Std. 1.5(f)): Respondent's failure to properly serve and file the Hulls' lawsuit and properly secure the appropriate preliminary injunction to delay the foreclosure sale then pending, ultimately resulted in the foreclosure sale of the clients primary residence to go forward and caused significant harm and delay to the client. (*In the Matter of Bach* (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 631, where attorney's loss of client's cause of action constituted significant harm.)

Multiple Acts of Misconduct (Std. 1.5(b)): Respondent committed multiple acts of misconduct, specifically violations of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A) [failure to perform], rule 4-100(B)(3) [failure to account], and Business and Professions Code section 6106 [moral turpitude/misrepresentations to client and court] and Business and Professions Code section 6106.3[loan modification]. *In the Matter of Conner* (Review Dept. 2008) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 93.

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

Pretrial Stipulation: Respondent has stipulated to misconduct and thereby demonstrated his cooperation with the State Bar and saved the State Bar's resources. (*Silva-Vidor v. State Bar* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1071, 1079 [where mitigative credit was given for entering into a stipulation as to facts and culpability].)

AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.

The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct "set forth a means for determining the appropriate disciplinary sanction in a particular case and to ensure consistency across cases dealing with similar misconduct and surrounding circumstances." (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, std. 1.1. All further references to Standards are to this source.) The Standards help fulfill the primary purposes of discipline, which include: protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; maintenance of the highest professional standards; and preservation of public confidence in the legal profession. (See std. 1.1; *In re Morse* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 184, 205.)

Although not binding, the standards are entitled to "great weight" and should be followed "whenever possible" in determining level of discipline. (*In re Silverton* (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 92, quoting *In re Brown* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 205, 220 and *In re Young* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 267, fn. 11.) Adherence to the standards in the great majority of cases serves the valuable purpose of eliminating disparity and assuring consistency, that is, the imposition of similar attorney discipline for instances of similar attorney misconduct. (*In re Naney* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 190.)

In this matter, Respondent admits to committing seven acts of professional misconduct. Standard 1.7(a) requires that where a Respondent "commits two or more acts of misconduct and the Standards specify different sanctions for each act, the most severe sanction must be imposed." Standard 1.7(b) provides where aggravating circumstances are found and the net effect demonstrates a greater sanction is needed to fulfill the primary purposes of discipline, it is appropriate to recommend greater discipline than otherwise specified in a given standard. Standard 1.8 (b) provides where a member has two or more prior disciplines, disbarment is appropriate where, as in this pending matter, the prior discipline involved actual suspension, the totality of the disciplinary matters evidences a pattern of misconduct and that the member is either unwilling or unable to conform to ethical responsibilities.

The most severe sanction applicable to Respondent's misconduct is found in standard 2.7, which applies to Respondent's violation of section 6106 of the Business and Professions Code. Standard 2.7 provides that disbarment is appropriate for an act of moral turpitude, dishonesty, fraud, corruption or concealment of a material fact, depending upon the extent to which the victim of the misconduct is harmed or mislead and depending upon the magnitude of the act of misconduct and the degree to which it relates to the member's acts within the practice of law. Especially in conjunction with Std. 1.8(b), as explained below, disbarment is required here.

In analyzing the factors of Standard 2.7, the magnitude of the misconduct is significant. Respondent's conduct in repeatedly misrepresenting to his clients the status and of the federal action and the reality of what transpired with respect to his attempt to file the complaint and secure a substantive ruling on the merits as to the injunctive relief sought, constitutes moral turpitude. Respondent's dishonesty and manipulation of the truth is readily apparent in these acts of misconduct, all of which occur during Respondent's practice of law.

Respondent also repeatedly misrepresented to the clients that he was not pursuing loan modification related activities on their behalf when he was, and that he was effectively moving forward to protect the clients interest with an imminent foreclosure sale date, when in fact he had done nothing affirmatively in competent fashion to promote the clients retained objective.

Respondent's misconduct was directly related to the practice of law. In addition to lying to his clients, Respondent submitted a declaration under penalty of perjury to the court stating he had given proper notice of an ex parte application when he had not. The submission of a false declaration by an attorney not only undermines the ability of the courts to rely on the accuracy of sworn statements, it also diminishes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Respondent's prior misconduct mirrors in many respects Respondent's present inability to accurately convey the truth under oath. Respondent is either unwilling or unable to reform his behavior. (*In the Matter of Rose* (Review Dept. 1997) 3 Cal. State Bar Court Rptr. 646 [disbarment appropriate where prior discipline coupled with probation has not rehabilitated attorney].)

Respondent committed additional misconduct too, as set forth above, which only underscores the gravity of his misconduct. By virtue of his prior discipline and the deception surrounding the current matter, disbarment is the appropriate discipline, in keeping with the Standards.

COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.

Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has informed Respondent that as of March 3, 2015, the prosecution costs in this matter are approximately \$7,252. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.

EXCLUSION FROM MCLE CREDIT

Pursuant to rule 3201, Respondent may <u>not</u> receive MCLE credit for completion of State Bar Ethics School, State Bar Client Trust Accounting School, and/or any other educational course(s) to be ordered as a condition of reproval or suspension. (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 3201.)

ORIGINAL

In the Matter of: KEITH HAMMOND	BRAY Case number(s 13-O-12487-Y	
L	SIGNATURE OF THE	PARTIES
recitations and each of th	, the parties and their coursel, as applica e terms and conditions of this Stipulation	ble, signify their agreement with each of the Re Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Disposition.
3 · 6 · 2015 Date	Respondent's Signature	Keith Hammond Bray Print Name
Date	Respondent's Counsel Signature	Kenneth C. Kocourek
arch 17 '15	1 typh Rawiger	Print Name Hugh G. Radigan
Date	Deputy Trial Counsel's Signature	Print Name

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ORIGINAL

In the Matter of: KEITH HAMMOND	BRAY Case number(s): 13-O-12487-YE	DR
By their signatures below recitations and each of the second sec	SIGNATURE OF THE F the parties and their counsel, as applicable terms and conditions of this Stipulation R Respondent's Signature Respondent's Counsel Signature	
Date	Deputy Trial Counsel's Signature	Hugh G. Radigan Print Name

In the Matter of: KEITH HAMMOND BRAY

Case Number(s): 13-O-12487-YDR

DISBARMENT ORDER

Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any, is GRANTED without prejudice, and:

- The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
- The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
- All Hearing dates are vacated.
- 1. Page 7, #14, first line, insert "proof of service" after March 18, 2013 and before Respondent.
- 2. Page 10, last paragraph, second line, delete "and" after status.

The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58(E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)

Respondent Keith Hammond Bray is ordered transferred to involuntary inactive status pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6007, subdivision (c)(4). Respondent's inactive enrollment will be effective three (3) calendar days after this order is served by mail and will terminate upon the effective date of the Supreme Court's order imposing discipline herein, or as provided for by rule 5.111(D)(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California, or as otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court pursuant to its plenary jurisdiction.

Jul 3, 2015

YVETTE D. ROLAND Judge of the State Bar Court

Page ____

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on April 7, 2015, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING; ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE ENROLLMENT

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:

by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:

KENNETH CHARLES KOCOUREK 5785 BROCKTON AVE RIVERSIDE, CA 92506

by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

HUGH RADIGAN, Enforcement, Los Angeles

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on April 7, 2015.

arpenter NOI Angela Cappenter

Case Administrator State Bar Court